Regulatory Theory and the Enforcement of the Financial Protections of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act by Jensen, Kirk D.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 55 | Number 1 Article 2
10-7-2015
Regulatory Theory and the Enforcement of the
Financial Protections of the Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act
Kirk D. Jensen
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Kirk D. Jensen, Regulatory Theory and the Enforcement of the Financial Protections of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 55 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 53 (2015).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol55/iss1/2
 53 
REGULATORY THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE FINANCIAL PROTECTIONS OF THE 
SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT 
Kirk D. Jensen* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ............................................................................. 54 
I. Characteristics of Agency Behavior .................................... 57 
A. Tendency toward Increasingly Aggressive 
Interpretations ........................................................ 58 
B. Tunnel Vision .......................................................... 65 
C. Evaluation of Marginal Costs and Benefits ........... 66 
D. Short-Term Bias ...................................................... 68 
II. The History and Evolution of the SCRA’s Balancing of 
Servicemember and Creditor Interests ......................... 68 
A. Pre-1918 Moratory Legislation ............................... 70 
B. The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 
1918 ......................................................................... 71 
C. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 ......... 76 
D. Developments Between 1942 and 2003 .................. 78 
E. The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003 ......... 82 
F. Post-2003 Amendments .......................................... 83 
G. The Central Concept: Material Effect .................... 85 
III. The SCRA and Aggressive Enforcement .......................... 87 
A. Strict Liability: A New Standard ............................ 88 
B. Strict Liability in Government Enforcement ......... 95 
C. Expansion of Liability Under the SCRA ................ 99 
1. Expansion of the Scope of Default Judgment 
Protection ......................................................... 100 
2. Expansion of the Interest Rate Protection ...... 109 
D. Expansion of Liability and the Rule of Lenity ..... 120 
IV. The Costs of Upsetting the Balance ................................ 124 
 
 * Partner, BuckleySandler LLP, Washington, DC.  B.A., Brigham Young 
University; J.D., Duke University School of Law. 
54 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 55 
Conclusion ............................................................................. 128 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In observing the behavior of regulatory agencies, 
scholars have observed many bureaucratic tendencies and 
biases that often influence agency decision making.  Even 
well-intentioned agencies acting in good faith may be 
influenced by these predilections because they are a result of 
human cognitive processes and naturally-occurring 
incentives.1  Scholars have identified many such tendencies 
and biases, including (1) the tendency for agencies to take 
increasingly aggressive interpretations of the laws they 
administer; (2) a tunnel vision and selection bias resulting in 
a myopic focus on regulatory mission; (3) a limited ability to 
evaluate the marginal costs and benefits of actions, including 
a discounting of externalized costs; and (4) a bias toward 
short-term goals even at the expense of long-term costs.2 
 The tendency toward aggressive administration can 
lead a regulatory agency to overextend, or take an overly 
muscular view of the laws it enforces in ways that may be 
inconsistent with broader public policy or even with the goals 
of the legislation itself.  The tunnel vision bias can lead an 
agency to focus so closely on advancing its own regulatory 
agenda that it pays inadequate attention to costs that its 
actions may impose in other areas and that may impede other 
important policy goals.  The limited ability to measure 
marginal costs and benefits can lead an agency to overvalue 
those marginal benefits consistent with its regulatory 
mission, while undervaluing the costs that are external to its 
regulatory purview.  And the short-term bias can cause an 
agency to focus primarily or exclusively on the short-term 
gains of its actions while giving less attention to the longer-
term implications of its actions. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor 
Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 313–14 (2013) (noting 
that cognitive biases do not evidence bad faith, but instead arise from “common 
human development.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Institutional Review Boards as Academic 
Bureaucracies: An Economic and Experiential Analysis, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 861, 
872 (2007). 
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 These identified bureaucratic tendencies are useful in 
understanding agency decision making in connection with the 
many recent agency actions enforcing the financial 
protections of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA).3  
The SCRA provides wide-reaching protections to 
servicemembers4—defined generally in the SCRA as any 
member of the uniformed services, including the U.S. armed 
forces5—regarding consumer financial products, such as 
mortgages, credit cards, automobile loans, student loans, real 
estate and automobile leases, and more.6  Although the SCRA 
languished in regulatory obscurity for many years, it is not 
surprising that—with over two million active duty 
servicemembers and National Guard and Reserve 
members7—the Act’s financial services protections have been 
the source of intense scrutiny in recent years.  Since 2011, 
federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies have 
 
 3. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–515, 516–597b 
(2012) (effective Dec. 19, 2003). 
 4. Although use of the term “service member” would ordinarily be 
grammatically correct, this Article will use “servicemember” throughout in 
order to be consistent with the statute. 
 5. 50 U.S.C. app. § 511(1); 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5).  The term “uniformed 
services” is defined to include members of the armed forces, as well as the 
commissioned corps of the Public Health Service and National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration.  10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5).  The SCRA’s protections 
generally apply to servicemembers in “military service,” which includes active 
duty in the uniformed services, as well as active National Guard service in cases 
where the call to service is authorized by the President or Secretary of Defense, 
supported by federal funds, and meets other criteria.  50 U.S.C. app. § 511(2).  
“Active duty” extends beyond deployment, and includes many members of the 
full-time armed forces serving within the continental United States.  10 U.S.C. § 
101(d)(1). 
 6. The SCRA provides wide-reaching protections to servicemembers 
regarding consumer financial products and services.  These include limitations 
on the rate of interest on a credit obligation the servicemember incurs prior to 
military service, limitations on the foreclosure and repossession of collateral 
securing a credit obligation, the ability to terminate leases on premises and 
automobiles, and protections regarding eviction of a servicemember and his or 
her dependents from a rental property.  50 U.S.C. app. §§ 531–35 (2012).  The 
Act also provides important procedural protections for servicemembers, 
including protections regarding default judgments, the ability to stay civil 
proceedings when military service materially affects the servicemember’s ability 
to participate in a proceeding, and the tolling of statutes of limitation and 
periods to redeem real property.  Id. §§ 521–26. 
 7. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-221, SERVICEMEMBERS 
CIVIL RELIEF ACT: INFORMATION ON MORTGAGE PROTECTIONS AND RELATED 
EDUCATION EFFORTS 8 (2014) [hereinafter GAO SCRA REPORT], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660398.pdf. 
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entered into over twenty public settlements with financial 
institutions resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in 
remediation and penalties.8  Other non-public actions have 
increased the total amount even further.  The U.S. 
Department of Justice has also brought criminal prosecutions 
against individuals it alleged violated the financial 
protections of the SCRA.9  Recent statements by federal and 
state enforcement agencies indicate that this scrutiny has not 
abated and will not abate in the near future.10  And other 
government agencies continue to scrutinize the Act and the 
financial protections it provides to servicemembers.11  This 
government scrutiny is in addition to ongoing private 
litigation over SCRA issues.12 
 While the SCRA was obviously intended to protect 
servicemembers, it was also carefully designed to balance 
servicemember interests with the legitimate interests of 
servicemembers’ creditors.13  Unlike previous laws placing 
absolute moratoria on actions against servicemembers, the 
SCRA permits actions against servicemembers except in 
cases where the servicemember’s military service materially 
affects the servicemember’s ability to protect his or her 
 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See, e.g., David Palmer, Cullman Used Car Dealer Indicted in Federal 
Court, CULLMAN TIMES (Mar. 28, 2013),  
http://www.cullmantimes.com/local/x237731114/Cullman-used-car-dealer-
indicted-in-federal-court. 
 10. See, e.g., Press Release, State of Del. News, Biden: Financial 
Institutions Must Follow Financial Laws Protecting Military Personnel (Oct. 3, 
2013), available at http://news.delaware.gov/2013/10/03/biden-financial-
institutions-must-follow-financial-laws-protecting-military-personnel/ 
(demanding information from “nearly 30 leading lending institutions” regarding 
SCRA compliance and urging federal law makers to give state attorneys general 
authority to prosecute violations of the SCRA); CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN 
OMBUDSMAN 7 (Oct. 16, 2013), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_student-loan-ombudsman-
annual-report.pdf (noting ongoing complaints that “a number of market 
[student loan] participants were making improper demands of active-duty 
servicemembers seeking benefits under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act” 
and committing that “[t]he CFPB will continue to work closely with bank 
regulators and the U.S. Department of Justice to ensure that the law is being 
followed and violators are held accountable.”). 
 11. See, e.g., GAO SCRA REPORT, supra note 7. 
 12. E.g., Jimenez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 1:11-cv-23131-SCOLA (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 18, 2013). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
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interests or to comply with his or her obligations.  But as 
regulatory theorists may predict, the agencies enforcing the 
SCRA have aggressively enforced the Act solely with a focus 
on benefitting servicemembers, giving short shrift to the 
balancing of interests central to the Act and the potential 
costs of these aggressive enforcement positions.  This Article 
for the first time examines the positions adopted by the 
agencies enforcing the SCRA and shows that too many of 
these positions are inconsistent with the purpose, structure, 
and text of the SCRA itself.  In so doing, this Article provides 
additional support for several of the bureaucratic tendencies 
observed by regulatory theorists. 
 This Article begins by focusing on the four 
bureaucratic tendencies identified above that are useful in 
understanding the agencies’ SCRA enforcement actions and 
positions taken therein.  Next, because understanding the 
balancing of servicemember and creditor interests built into 
the SCRA is critical to understanding the agency departure 
from that balancing of interests, this Article includes a 
discussion of the history and evolution of the SCRA, showing 
that for nearly a century the Act has been designed to balance 
servicemember and creditor interests.  Following that 
discussion, the Article discusses recent SCRA enforcement 
decisions, and shows that many of the public and non-public 
positions on SCRA provisions taken by the agencies are 
inconsistent with the purpose and structure of the Act—and, 
in some cases, inconsistent with the statutory text itself.  This 
result is consistent with regulatory theory’s observations 
regarding bureaucratic tendencies and biases.  Finally, the 
Article will discuss some of the external costs imposed by the 
agencies’ enforcement of the SCRA that do not appear to have 
factored into the agencies’ decision making. 
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF AGENCY BEHAVIOR 
 Regulatory theorists have identified many tendencies 
that can affect a regulatory agency’s decision making 
processes for better or worse.14  Some are the result of various 
incentives operating on the agency, some may be the result of 
cognitive biases that influence all human decision making, 
 
 14. E.g., Zywicki, supra note 2, at 872–78 (discussing factors that may 
contribute to poor decision making in governmental bureaucracies). 
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and some may have other root causes.  Four of these 
tendencies in particular are useful in understanding agency 
behavior in SCRA enforcement actions.  These are the 
tendency toward an agency taking increasingly aggressive 
positions in interpreting and enforcing the statutes under the 
agency’s purview; a tunnel vision resulting in a myopic focus 
on regulatory mission; a limited ability to evaluate the 
marginal costs and benefits of actions, including a 
discounting of externalized costs; and a bias toward short-
term goals even at the expense of long-term costs.  It is 
important to note that while these predilections can have 
profound impact on agency decision making, they do not 
suggest bad faith on the part of any particular decision 
maker.  While bad faith may be a risk in the case of any 
decision maker, the bureaucratic tendencies discussed below 
are a natural part of the human condition and therefore may 
influence agency decision making even when decision makers 
are well-intentioned and are making sincere efforts to achieve 
favorable policy results as they see them. 
A. Tendency toward Increasingly Aggressive 
Interpretations 
 Government agencies have a natural tendency to take 
increasingly aggressive positions both in seeking to expand 
the agency’s jurisdiction and in interpreting and applying the 
laws the agency administers.  This tendency is largely the 
result of a variety of incentives that exist at both the agency 
and individual decision maker levels. 
 Scholars have argued that public entities respond to 
many of the same incentives to act in a self-interested fashion 
as private entities—including the incentive to try to maximize 
the financial recoveries from enforcement actions.15  This 
position may seem counterintuitive, particularly given that 
public-sector employees—including decision makers at 
administrative agencies—are paid on salary.  Thus, public-
sector decision makers may not stand to profit financially in 
the same way that private sector employees would.  For 
example, if counsel representing a class of plaintiffs helps her 
clients achieve a large cash award or settlement, counsel also 
 
 15. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public 
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 856–57 (2014). 
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generally will be handsomely compensated.16  But counsel 
representing a government agency who helps the agency 
achieve a large cash award or settlement—whether the funds 
pass entirely to others, or part or all is retained by the 
agency—generally will not profit monetarily for her success. 
 That does not mean, however, that government 
agencies and those who work for them are not also strongly 
incentivized to maximize financial recoveries.  Where 
agencies are entitled to retain a portion or all of the recovery, 
the agency has an obvious monetary incentive to maximize 
recoveries.  Whether this added revenue supplements 
legislative appropriations, or offsets reduced appropriations, 
the impact on the agency’s ability to maintain its activities 
and staffing levels can be significant.17  And even where 
agencies do not retain all or part of the recovery, the agency 
remains highly incentivized to maximize recoveries.  Agencies 
are incentivized by reputational awards as well as monetary 
ones.  An agency’s reputation for being a strong and effective 
enforcement agency can provide important benefits to the 
agency in terms of oversight by legislatures and executive 
officials, deference from judges, and perception of the public 
generally.18 
 This incentive may be particularly powerful for 
agencies previously accused of inadequate oversight of their 
respective stewardships.  For example, the federal banking 
 
 16. Indeed, in some cases the resolution of class action litigation enriches 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers while class members receive only a coupon.  See, e.g., 
Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in 
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991 (2002) 
(demonstrating that coupons issued in coupon-based settlements are 
increasingly being structured to resemble promotional coupons, “making the 
settlement worthless to many (and sometimes most) class members.”); David A. 
Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of 
Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 327 
(2001) (“In a number of consumer fraud class actions, the lawyers negotiated 
deals, which some courts approved, in which class members received coupons of 
little real economic value, and the plaintiffs’ lawyers received millions of dollars 
calculated based on the purely nominal value of the coupons.”); Jean R. 
Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the 
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 34 (2000) (“The ‘coupon’ class 
actions have become symbolic of this concern, with class members receiving a 
few coupons toward the purchase of a new car, airline ticket, or dog food, while 
class attorneys reap large fees.”). 
 17. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 864–71. 
 18. Id. at 877–78. 
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agencies have been subjected to withering public scrutiny 
regarding their efforts to ensure SCRA compliance.  In 
January 2011, JPMorgan Chase announced that it had “made 
mistakes” in compliance with the SCRA’s foreclosure and 
interest rate cap protections.19  This announcement quickly 
led the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs to hold 
hearings on alleged SCRA violations.20  During this hearing, 
members of the plaintiffs’ bar testified of the SCRA violations 
they claimed to have seen during their representations of 
servicemembers.21  This increased scrutiny subsequently led 
to a report by the Government Accountability Office, which 
concluded that regulatory oversight of financial institutions’ 
SCRA compliance was limited.22  Under such scrutiny, it 
should come as no surprise that the regulatory agencies 
tasked with SCRA oversight and enforcement—the federal 
banking agencies and the Department of Justice—would have 
strong incentives to demonstrate renewed and increased 
vigilance in ensuring SCRA compliance by bringing public 
enforcement actions.  It is no coincidence that the first, in 
what has become a long line of SCRA enforcement actions, 
was settled just a few months after the Committee hearings 
on alleged SCRA violations.23  It should also come as no 
surprise that regulatory agencies would seek to demonstrate 
this renewed vigilance by seeking large monetary recoveries.  
Scholars have observed that all else being equal, agencies will 
emphasize more easily measured metrics.24  Thus, 
enforcement agencies seeking to build or rehabilitate 
reputations as strong and effective will naturally gravitate 
 
 19. E.g., Karen Jowers, Chase Spends $2M to Fix Errors on Military 
Mortgages, USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2011-01-21-millitary-
mortgage-blunder_N.htm. 
 20. Alleged Violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Cong. 1 (2011). 
 21. See id. at 66–68 (statement of Richard A. Harpootlian); id. at 82–83 
(statement of Col. John S. Odom, Jr.). 
 22. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-700, 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT HAS BEEN LIMITED 19–20 (2012) 
[hereinafter GAO MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES]. 
 23. See infra notes 212–217 and accompanying text. 
 24. See generally Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the 
Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 n.30 
(2009) (citing studies). 
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toward more easily measured forms of success.25  And few 
measures of success are as easily measured as win rates and 
financial recoveries.26  Indeed, because financial recoveries 
are stated in dollar amounts, they are easily understood and 
digested, are generally indisputable, and are easily 
comparable.27  Unlike win rates and other metrics, financial 
recoveries convey information about the magnitude and 
importance of the agency’s enforcement activities.28  Agency 
focus on financial recoveries is perhaps most easily observed 
in the captions of the press releases announcing various 
settlements of SCRA-related enforcement actions, which 
typically trumpet the amount of financial recovery.29  Because 
other aspects of enforcement actions are less easily 
quantifiable (e.g., forward-looking changes in a company’s 
policies and practices), the amount of financial recovery takes 
on particular significance for enforcement agencies.30 
 Of course, government agencies are not sentient 
beings; agency actions are determined and conducted by 
individuals.  The incentives of individual agency employees 
are complicated and have been the subject of substantial 
scholarly focus.31  The general perception has been that 
 
 25. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 639 
(2010) (“[T]he SEC tends to pursue high profile matters, to change its priorities 
frequently in accordance with public opinion, and perhaps most significantly, to 
pursue readily observable objectives, often at the expense of more important but 
less observable objectives.”). 
 26. See, e.g., id. at 644–45; Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 876. 
 27. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 876. 
 28. Id. at 877. 
 29. See, e.g., Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Amendments to Consent Orders Memorialize $9.3 Billion Foreclosure 
Agreement (Feb. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20130228a.htm; 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Service Members to Receive $39 Million for 
Violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (Apr. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/April/13-crt-383.html; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, $25 Billion Mortgage Servicing Agreement Filed in Federal 
Court (Mar. 12, 2012), available at 
https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Settlement-USDOJ-FILING-news-
release.pdf. 
 30. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 876. 
 31. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36–42 (1971) (stating that theories of 
government agencies must take into account the personal preferences of 
bureaucrats); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
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agency employees, including enforcement counsel, have “low 
powered” incentives relative to private-sector employees.32  
However, Professors Lemos and Minzner have recently 
argued that agency enforcement attorneys, whether career or 
non-career, also have strong incentives to achieve large 
financial recoveries in enforcement actions.33  These 
incentives may affect even the best-intentioned agency 
personnel.  These include the incentive to increase their 
desirability to current and future employers (particularly for 
non-career counsel who may be eyeing a move to the private-
sector), and the incentive to enhance their individual internal 
and external reputations.34 
 These agency and individual incentives naturally lead 
to action.  And the incentives influence agency action in 
predictable ways.  First, agency and individual incentives can 
lead to an increased volume of enforcement activity.  When 
the agency has a financial or reputational incentive to pursue 
financial recovery through enforcement, agency officials will 
be inclined to initiate more enforcement actions.35  Second, 
these incentives can influence the type of remedies sought.  
While forward-looking injunctive relief may provide for 
greater public benefit in many cases, it is inherently more 
difficult to measure and provides less short-term reward to 
the agency.  For example, if SCRA enforcement actions 
increase SCRA compliance throughout the financial services 
industry, it is unlikely that the absence of SCRA claims five 
years in the future will result in increased recognition or 
accolades to the enforcement agencies.  But large financial 
recoveries provide significant recognition immediately.  
Accordingly, all else being equal, one would expect that both 
financial and reputational incentives would shift agency 
efforts toward greater financial recoveries.36 
 A focus on financial recovery can be increased by 
 
DO AND WHY THEY DO IT, at x (1989) (noting that economic and political 
scientists have recognized that bureaucrats, like entrepreneurs, seek to 
maximize their utility). 
 32. See, e.g., Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 887–89 (summarizing 
research). 
 33. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 893. 
 34. Id. at 891–94. 
 35. Id. at 896–98. 
 36. Id. at 898–900. 
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competition among administrative agencies.  Where multiple 
agencies have overlapping jurisdiction, one can expect that 
the financial and reputational incentives of enforcement 
actions can lead to competition among agencies, particularly 
competition with respect to recovery amounts.37  In the SCRA 
enforcement context, this is evident in the remediation 
frameworks established by different federal enforcement 
agencies.  The SCRA provides that the Department of Justice 
may seek penalties of up to $55,000 for a first violation, and 
up to $110,000 for subsequent violations.38  But in the April 
2012 National Mortgage Settlement,39 the Department of 
Justice increased the penalty amount to $116,785 per 
violation (plus any additional amount representing equity lost 
by the borrower).40  Not to be outdone, in June 2012, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the 
Federal Reserve Board announced a remediation framework 
for use in the Independent Foreclosure Review that further 
increased the SCRA per-violation penalty to $125,000 (plus 
lost equity).41  The agencies did not provide a public 
explanation for the successive increases over the statutory 
cap of $110,000 per violation, but inter-agency competition 
would appear to be the most likely explanation. 
 These incentives also lead regulatory agencies to seek 
to expand their power and influence within whatever 
constraints and counter-incentives exist within the 
institutional framework in which they operate.  This tendency 
can manifest itself in a sort of “empire building,” through 
which the agency seeks to expand its jurisdiction and sphere 
of influence.42  But it can also manifest itself in an 
increasingly aggressive assertion of the laws the agency is 
empowered to enforce.  Scholars have similarly identified this 
tendency in specialty tribunals, such as the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which tend to adopt an overly muscular 
 
 37. Id. at 901–03. 
 38. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 597b (2012). 
 39. See infra notes 221–32 and accompanying text. 
 40. Consent Judgment § II(a)(1) Ex. H at 3–4, United States v. Bank of Am. 
Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012). 
 41. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency & Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Financial Remediation Framework for Use in the Independent 
Foreclosure Review, at 2 (June 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20120621b2.pdf. 
 42. Zywicki, supra note 2, at 872–74. 
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view of the laws entrusted to them.43  And, of course, an 
aggressive interpretation of the laws it administers can 
contribute to the agency achieving greater financial and 
reputational awards in more cases—particularly if that 
aggressive interpretation is applied retroactively through an 
enforcement action. 
 A tendency to take increasingly aggressive positions in 
interpreting a statute through enforcement may be 
exacerbated if the agency views the risk of losing in litigation 
as minimal.44  SCRA enforcement may be a case study of this 
principle.  Servicemembers are held in high esteem by the 
majority of Americans.  They have also been defined as a 
vulnerable population under the Dodd-Frank Act.45  Financial 
institutions, on the other hand, generally have not been 
considered sympathetic defendants in recent years.46  
Financial institutions must exercise caution in litigating 
SCRA issues against servicemembers because such actions, 
even if the institution believes them to be completely justified 
and consistent with the Act, may be portrayed by those 
opposing the financial institution as an effort to erode 
servicemember protections.  The negative public relations 
risk of appearing anti-servicemember is significant.  And this 
risk likely would be heightened if the opponent in such 
litigation is a government agency, which no doubt would 
broadcast its efforts as motivated solely by desires to protect 
servicemember interests.  It is no surprise that no financial 
 
 43. E.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A 
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
657, 659 (2009). 
 44. E.g., Zywicki, supra note 2, at 873 (“[R]egulators’ decisions as to when 
and how to intervene are understood to result from the interplay between the 
pursuit of their own self-interests and the constraints and incentives created by 
the institutional framework in which they operate.”). 
 45. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 1013(e), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (creating the Office of 
Servicemember Affairs to assist military families); but see Creola Johnson, 
Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians from 
Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649, 675–76 (2012) (arguing that 
military families enjoy financial benefits that exceed those enjoyed by civilians, 
including health care benefits, tax advantages, and housing). 
 46. E.g., Laura Alix, Credit Unions Reporting Steady Loan Growth, BANKER 
& TRADESMAN (Sept. 22, 2013) (reporting that “banks are still battling negative 
PR and the perception that all banks operate like the behemoths that 
contributed to the financial crisis.”), available at 
http://www.bankerandtradesman.com/news156618.html. 
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institution has litigated SCRA issues with government 
agencies.  And agency officials are no doubt aware of this 
dynamic.  It seems likely, therefore, that SCRA enforcement 
may be an area where enforcement officials are even more 
emboldened to take aggressive positions because of the 
perceived minimal risk of losing in court. 
B. Tunnel Vision 
 Just as an agency’s decision making may be influenced 
by incentives that lead it to take increasingly aggressive 
positions, it may also be influenced by tunnel vision, a focus 
on the agency’s regulatory agenda to the exclusion of other 
important social and policy goals.47  This myopic focus—
similar to the concept of “escalation of commitment” studied 
in psychology and management48—is hardly surprising.  
Specific agencies have specific spheres of responsibility and 
areas of expertise.  The agency and its resources will be 
focused on accomplishing its regulatory mission.49  Other 
competing goals that are not part of that regulatory mission 
will receive less if any attention.  And the subject matter 
expertise may not lend itself to considering other costs or 
implications of regulatory positions.  Indeed, the Department 
of Justice itself has noted that other agencies may be too 
prone to tunnel vision, focusing only, or primarily, on the 
agency’s own interests to the potential detriment of other 
public policy concerns.50  For example, Professor Zywicki has 
noted that an environmental enforcement agency may be 
poorly suited to evaluate—and may not even consider—the 
impact its environmental policy decisions may have on 
 
 47. E.g., Stephen Breyer, The Executive Branch, Administrative Action, and 
Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 2195 (2011) (concluding that 
agency decisions may reflect “ ‘ tunnel vision,’ an agency’s supreme confidence in 
the importance of its own mission to the point where it leaves common sense 
aside.”). 
 48. E.g., Jon B. Gould et al., Predicting Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 471, 504 n.82 (2014) (collecting studies). 
 49. E.g., David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the 
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 119 (2000) (“That agencies are 
systematically more loyal to their basic mission seems persuasive, even 
obvious.”). 
 50. E.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to 
Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 539 (2012) (discussing concerns about tunnel 
vision among the DOJ’s justifications for centralized government litigation 
control). 
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matters outside its sphere, such as on economic development 
or national security.51  And scholars have observed that this 
tunnel vision may be exacerbated in adversarial 
proceedings.52  Thus, one would expect the tunnel vision 
tendency to be heightened in enforcement actions relative to 
rulemakings. 
 A selection bias in hiring may also exacerbate this 
tendency.  It seems obvious that employees of an agency are 
more likely to be sympathetic to, rather than skeptical of, the 
agency’s mission.53  A person who believes in the mission of 
the agency, and is more willing to carry out that mission, is 
more likely to seek employment at the agency than a person 
who is not.  And the good feelings and emotional satisfaction 
resulting from the employee’s commitment to the agency’s 
mission may help offset the reduced monetary income of 
working for a government agency relative to the private 
sector.54  Thus, those who believe in the agency’s mission 
generally will carry out that mission, heightening the 
tendency to focus narrowly on the agency’s mission to the 
exclusion of other goals and ends.  This selection bias may 
also increase the tendency toward adopting increasingly 
aggressive interpretations of the laws the agency administers, 
since those who are most committed to an agency’s mission 
would be more prone to trying to expand that mission. 
C. Evaluation of Marginal Costs and Benefits 
 Regulatory theorists also observe that regulatory 
agencies tend to experience difficulties in estimating the 
marginal costs and benefits of regulatory action.  This is 
largely because the costs of agency action often do not fall 
upon the agency, but rather on private parties.55  In 
recognition of this limitation, Congress and executive officials 
 
 51. E.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political 
Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 
73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 893 (1999). 
 52. See generally Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple 
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006). 
 53. Spence & Cross, supra note 49, at 119 (“People who are sympathetic to 
that mission are more likely to be attracted to work at the agency.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 2, at 877 (discussing psychic and monetary 
income in selection bias); Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 889 (comparing 
income for government lawyers with first year associates at large law firms). 
 55. E.g., Zywicki, supra note 2, at 875. 
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have taken several steps to increase agency awareness of the 
costs imposed by regulatory actions.  For example, President 
Clinton issued Executive Order 12866, which required 
agencies to assess the costs and benefits of intended 
regulations.56  Additionally, the Regulatory Right-To-Know 
Act requires the Office of Management and Budget to prepare 
annual reports to Congress regarding the costs of federal 
regulations.57  But the same type and level of cost-benefit 
analysis and public disclosure is not applicable to 
enforcement actions.  Although enforcement agencies are 
expected to determine the public benefit of an enforcement 
action, including any deterrent on undesired conduct, the 
financial and reputational incentives will no doubt be factored 
(consciously or not) into this analysis.58 
 This limitation on ability to evaluate benefits and 
costs may be exacerbated when the potential costs are in 
spheres outside the agency’s jurisdiction and expertise.  As 
noted above, an environmental regulatory agency may be 
poorly suited to evaluate, if it even considers, the costs of its 
environmental policy decisions on areas outside its area of 
expertise, such as economic development and national 
security.59  Another example illustrating the limited ability of 
agencies to evaluate marginal costs involves the FDA’s 
limitations on manufacturers’ ability to communicate correct 
information about the effects of their products.  The FDA did 
not, however, factor into its decisions the impact its 
limitations had on the First Amendment rights of these 
manufacturers—an oversight for which courts subsequently 
took the FDA to task.60 
 
 56. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (“Each agency 
shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and, 
recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or 
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the 
intended regulation justify its costs.”). 
 57. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(3) 
[Title VI, § 624], 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-161 (2000). 
 58. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 15, at 897–98 (arguing that an agency’s 
cost-benefit analysis will be affected by the agency’s potential self-interest in 
the enforcement action). 
 59. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Zywicki, supra note 2, at 877–78 (discussing cases). 
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D. Short-Term Bias 
 A fourth tendency scholars have identified in 
regulatory agencies is a bias toward focusing on short-term 
results over longer-term effects.  This cognitive bias is not a 
result of bad faith, but is a natural tendency to focus on short-
term goals such as winning cases and maximizing recovery.61  
It is also a natural result of the incentives of administrative 
agencies.  Agencies function in a political world which 
prioritizes public results.  Short-term gains, particularly 
those that can be counted in dollars, make more public and 
political impact than longer-term welfare improvements.  
Political officials may hold their positions only until the next 
election or administration change.  Accordingly, they may be 
more inclined, whether intentionally or not, to support 
enforcement officials who achieve short-term results that are 
readily identifiable and easily quantifiable.  Even agency 
officials who would consciously prefer long-term welfare 
maximization may suffer from this cognitive bias, leading to 
an inadvertent focus on short-term over long-term benefits.62  
This bias may affect the evaluation of costs as well as 
benefits.  This may be particularly true when the benefit is 
immediate but the cost is borne over the long term.63 
II. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE SCRA’S 
BALANCING OF SERVICEMEMBER AND CREDITOR 
INTERESTS 
 One of the ways the bureaucratic tendencies identified 
by regulatory theorists has been exhibited by the agencies’ 
SCRA enforcement efforts is in the agencies’ departure from 
the SCRA’s balancing of servicemember and creditor 
interests.  As was true of its predecessor legislation, the 
SCRA is obviously intended to benefit servicemembers and 
their dependents.64  Servicemembers face serious challenges 
 
 61. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 1, at 313–14 (citing studies). 
 62. E.g., James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and 
Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 779, 
795 (2012). 
 63. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 62, at 782. 
 64. See, e.g., James P. Pottorff, Contemporary Applications of the Soldiers’ 
and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 132 MIL. L. REV. 115, 116 (1991) (“The premise 
underlying the SSCRA is that service members should not be disadvantaged 
either legally or financially when called to active service.”). 
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when they enter military service, particularly those who are 
called by their nation to leave civilian life to enter the 
military.  As one commentator observed, “active military 
service may cause severe, often insurmountable, problems in 
handling personal affairs back home: frequent involuntary 
moves, extended deployments overseas, long separations from 
families sometimes with little advance notice.”65  Such 
concerns understandably can distract servicemembers from 
the task at hand, not only jeopardizing their own security but 
also potentially impairing the national defense.66  
Accordingly, Congress enacted the SCRA “to provide for the 
temporary suspension of judicial and administrative 
proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect the 
civil rights of servicemembers during their military service” 
in order “to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national 
defense through protection extended by this Act to 
servicemembers of the United States to enable such persons 
to devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the 
Nation.”67 
 But as important as that objective is, the Act was 
designed to do even more. 
Congress addressed these problems [faced by servicemembers] 
adequately and equitably through the Act’s skillfully crafted 
balance among the needs of our nation for a strong national 
defense, the needs of Servicemembers—and their families—for 
security in their personal affairs, and the needs of those who 
have dealt with and depend upon Servicemembers for 
fulfillment of their obligations.68   
In other words, Congress designed the SCRA not only to 
protect servicemembers and their interests, but also to 
 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 51 (2003) (quoting The Servicemembers’ Civil 
Relief Act and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Hearings on H.R. 5111 
and H.R. 4017 Before the Subcomm. on Benefits of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ 
Affairs, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (2002) (statement of Craig W. Duehring, Acting 
Assistant Sec’y of Def., Reserve Affairs, Dep’t of Def. [hereinafter Duehring 
Statement]). 
 66. See, e.g., id. (“Congress also recognized the need to have military men 
and women focused on their operational mission free from worry about the 
welfare of their families or their personal affairs.”). 
 67. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 502 (2003). 
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 51 (quoting Duehring Statement, supra note 
65, at 3–4, 133). 
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protect creditors to whom servicemembers owe obligations.69  
This Part discusses the history and evolution of the balancing 
of these interests, following with a discussion of the agencies’ 
departure from this balancing of interests in Part III. 
A. Pre-1918 Moratory Legislation 
 The SCRA has its roots in moratory legislation from 
the Civil War and earlier.  Moratory legislation—legislation 
staying actions against military servicemembers while those 
servicemembers were at war—has a long history.  Moratory 
legislation was passed by European countries during the 
Thirty Years’ War, the war of Spanish succession, the 
Napoleonic Wars, and the War of 1870.70  The first such law 
in the United States was passed during the War of 1812.71  In 
December of 1812, with British troops advancing rapidly on 
New Orleans and battles raging along the nation’s then-
western border, the Louisiana legislature implemented a 
“stay law” which provided that “ ‘ no civil suit or action shall 
be commenced, or prosecuted before any court of record, or 
any tribunal of the state, till the first of May next.’ ”72 
 During the American Civil War, the legislatures of 
several states—both Union and Confederate—passed laws 
designed to stay legal actions to which the servicemember 
was a party.73  The U.S. Congress also enacted legislation 
 
 69. E.g., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. 
ARMY, JA 260, SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT GUIDE § 1-2, at 1-3 (2006) 
[hereinafter JAG SCRA GUIDE] (“[The] Act is also designed to protect rights of 
individuals having causes of action against persons in the military service.” 
(emphasis in original) (citing Ray v. Porter, 464 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1972); Ricard 
v. Birch, 529 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1975))). 
 70. A. H. Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46 HARV. L. 
REV. 1061, 1064 (1933); Robert H. Skilton, The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief 
Act of 1940 and the Amendments of 1942, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 178–79 (1942) 
[hereinafter Skilton, SSCRA]; see also generally Robert H. Skilton, Moratoria 
and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 227 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 28 (1943) [hereinafter Skilton, Moratoria]. 
 71. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 32 (2003) (citing the Louisiana law as the first 
moratoria statute in the United States). 
 72. Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 530, 546 (La. 1815) (quoting the Louisiana 
statute).  The Johnson court upheld the Louisiana law as a valid exercise of the 
State’s police power.  Id. at 542, 545.  See also Feller, supra note 70, at 1072–73 
(discussing the Louisiana stay law and Johnson); H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 32 
(2003). 
 73. See Feller, supra note 70, at 1081–85 (detailing state moratoria laws); 
Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Bill: Hearings on S. 2859 and H.R. 6361 
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automatically suspending statutes of limitation in matters 
involving servicemembers.74 
B. The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1918 
 Decades later, in the late stages of World War I, 
Congress again considered legislation to protect 
servicemembers whose military service may impair the 
servicemember’s ability to protect his or her interests.  At the 
time it was discussed, many of the states had already enacted 
moratory laws similar to those discussed above.75  These laws, 
like their predecessors, were absolute in character, 
preventing legal actions from commencing or progressing 
against servicemembers during military service.76  The 
inflexible nature of these laws was deemed unfair by many at 
the time of the First World War, since there were many cases 
where a servicemember may be in a position to protect his or 
her interests—and so the moratorium would provide little 
benefit to the servicemember, but substantial hardship to a 
servicemember’s creditors.77 
 In August of 1917, just weeks after the United States 
entered World War I, the Office of the Judge Advocate 
General prepared a draft of a bill that would later become the 
 
Before the S. Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 38 (1917) (discussing state 
laws protecting servicemembers); Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 178 
(discussing same); see also WILLIAM M. ROBINSON, JR., JUSTICE IN GREY: A 
HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 
83–88 (1941).  Moratory laws were also enacted subsequent to World War I 
during the Great Depression.  See, e.g., Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 178–
79 (“The late depression (and indeed all previous major depressions) produced 
many notable examples of governmentally imposed stays upon obligations, 
beginning with the Banking Holiday of 1933 and including a variety of 
moratoria on mortgage foreclosures.”). 
 74. Act of June 11, 1864, ch. 118, 13 Stat. 123. 
 75. Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 179; see also H.R. REP. NO. 181, at 3 
(1917), reprinted in 55 CONG. REC. 7789 (1917) (“In our own Civil War, almost 
every State, both North and South, passed some law to give protection against 
suit to men in military service.  Even now in the present war States have 
passed stay laws of one kind or another.  State statutes granting exemption to 
men in the National Guard are almost universal.  The variety of these laws now 
and in the Civil War is as wide as the laws are numerous.”).  Moratory 
legislation had also been passed in Germany, England, and France.  Comment, 
Moratory Legislation by Congress, 27 YALE L.J. 802, 805 (1918). 
 76. Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 179. 
 77. Id. 
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Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1918 (SSCRA).78  
Assisting the Judge Advocate General were prominent 
military lawyers, private-sector lawyers, and academics, 
including John H. Wigmore, the author of Wigmore on 
Evidence and later Dean of the Northwestern School of Law, 
who had been inducted into the military and assigned to the 
Judge Advocate General’s Office.79  Once the bill had been 
introduced into the House, the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, along with Major/Professor Wigmore and others, 
spent ten continuous days working on the draft, eventually 
producing a new bill.80 
 This new bill reflected the lessons learned from the 
unfairness of the Civil War federal legislation and other 
absolute moratoria.  The Committee’s report recommending 
enactment of the SSCRA explained that some 
servicemembers would be able to comply with their 
obligations and may continue to need unimpeded access to 
credit while in military service.  Because an absolute 
moratorium may risk creditors reducing servicemembers’ 
access to credit, the Committee concluded that an absolute 
moratorium “is as much mistaken kindness to the soldier as it 
is unnecessary.”81  Yet the Committee acknowledged that 
“freedom from harassing debts will make them better and 
more effective, more eager soldiers, than if their loyalty and 
zeal is tempered with the knowledge that their country, 
 
 78. See Mansfield Ferry, Samuel Rosenbaum & John H. Wigmore, The 
History of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act (With Explanatory Notes to 
the Different Sections and a Discussion of Its Constitutionality), 3 MASS. L. Q. 
204, 204 (1918) (discussing the history of the SSCRA legislation). 
 79. See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 33 (2003).  One of the principal 
concerns of the Committee was whether such civil relief legislation was 
permitted under the Constitution.  See, e.g., Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore, 
supra note 78 at 215–27 (analyzing the constitutionality of the SSCRA of 1918 
and concluding that the Act was constitutional).  In 1953, the SSCRA survived a 
challenge on constitutionality grounds.  In Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 
(1953), the Court held that such legislation is authorized by Congress’ power “to 
declare war” and “to raise and support armies.”  U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cls. 11–
12. 
 80. Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore, supra note 78, at 204 (discussing the 
process of drafting the bill); 55 CONG. REC. 7788 (1917) (statement of Rep. 
Webb) (discussing same); id. at 7793 (statement of Rep. Morgan) (“The authors 
of the bill were friends of all those in the military service.  They were in full 
sympathy with the men in our land and naval forces, and desired to give them 
every reasonable protection.”). 
 81. H.R. REP. NO. 181 (1917), reprinted in 55 CONG. REC. 7789 (1917). 
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which demands the supreme sacrifice, grudges a small 
measure of protection to their families and their homes.”82 
 Recognizing its duties both to servicemembers and to 
commercial interests,83 the Committee and those working 
with it produced a bill that sought to balance the needs of 
those competing interests.  Rather than enacting an absolute 
moratorium on civil actions, the Committee recommended 
giving discretion to courts regarding whether to stay matters 
or take other action to protect the interests of servicemembers 
and other parties.84  Three of those who worked with the 
Committee in drafting the legislation explained that the 
SSCRA was designed to be a departure from other previous 
and then-current approaches.85  Other approaches, including 
moratory legislation, created too broad an exemption from 
legitimate obligations since “there are many cases where the 
financial ability of soldiers to meet obligations in some way is 
not materially impaired by their entrance into service.”86  
Representative Webb, Chair of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, confirmed that the bill that would become the 
SSCRA was a departure from previous moratory legislation 
which was “arbitrary, inelastic, inflexible.”87  Rather than 
adopt similarly inflexible moratory legislation, 
Representative Webb explained that the bill was intended to 
give discretion to courts to achieve “even-handed justice 
between the creditor and the soldier,” and to avoid where 
possible the disruption of business interests.88 
 Thus, the Committee resolved to protect 
servicemembers in cases where the protection would be 
meaningful to the servicemember, while also giving creditors 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 7788 (“The committee has felt keenly its duty and responsibility, 
not only to the soldiers and sailors but to the commerce of the country, which in 
many ways already bears heavy war burdens.  It has not failed to appreciate 
that a large view of the exigencies of the war requires that any relief that is 
given to a soldier shall not be at the expense of industry.  The committee fully 
realizes the truth of the statement that the war is being fought in this country 
as well as on the battle fields of France, and that any drastic measure which 
even tended to cripple manufacturing and trade would be prejudicial to the 
country’s best interest.”). 
 84. Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore, supra note 78, at 207. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. 55 CONG. REC. 7787 (1917) (statement of Rep. Webb). 
 88. Id. 
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of servicemembers as much protection as possible under the 
circumstances.89  And to accomplish this balancing of 
interests, the Committee elected to grant broad discretion to 
the courts to resolve matters equitably and preserve the 
status quo where appropriate.90  This approach was adopted 
to provide protections both regarding procedural and 
substantive issues.  The drafters explained that the bill was 
not intended to prevent creditors from exercising legitimate 
obligations, but to require them to do so in court.  The court 
would then have discretion to protect a servicemember’s 
interests where the servicemember’s military service 
materially affected the servicemember’s ability to do so.91 
 On October 4, 1917, the House voted unanimously to 
pass the bill.92  The Senate then considered the bill passed by 
the House,93 and in turn voted unanimously to pass.94  The 
SSCRA of 1918 became law on March 8, 1918.95  The Act 
contained many provisions intended to benefit 
servicemembers, procedurally and substantively, in matters 
related to a servicemember’s financial obligations.  
Procedurally, the Act’s protections included (1) protections to 
servicemembers against default judgments, requiring 
plaintiffs to file an affidavit indicating whether a 
servicemember is in military service and permitting the 
vacation of judgments against servicemembers in certain 
circumstances;96 (2) requiring courts to stay civil actions or 
proceedings in which a servicemember is a party in certain 
circumstances;97 and (3) tolling statutes of limitation during a 
servicemember’s period of military service.98  Substantively, 
the SSCRA of 1918 included (1) limitations on eviction of a 
 
 89. Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 180. 
 90. Id. (“The solution was to throw the entire matter upon the courts, by 
giving them discretion to decide upon the grant of moratoria in individual cases, 
subject to certain guides defined in the statute. . . . It had both the advantages 
and disadvantages of elasticity.”). 
 91. Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore, supra note 78, at 207–08. 
 92. Id. at 204. 
 93. 56 CONG. REC. 1747 (1918) (statement of Sen. Overman) (stating that 
the Senate considered the bill as passed by the House). 
 94. Id. at 1755. 
 95. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 65-103, 40 Stat. 440 
(1918). 
 96. Id. § 200. 
 97. Id. § 201. 
 98. Id. § 205. 
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servicemember or a servicemember’s dependents without a 
court order;99 (2) limitations on the repossession of real or 
personal property purchased through an installment contract 
for purchase, or leased “with a view to purchase such 
property,” without a court order, and permitting a court to 
stay repossession proceedings in certain circumstances;100 and 
(3) provision that a foreclosure of real or personal property 
secured by a mortgage, trust deed, or other security in the 
nature of a mortgage is invalid unless pursuant to court 
order, and permitting a court to stay foreclosure proceedings 
in certain circumstances.101  In the final Act, the balancing of 
servicemember and commercial interests was achieved by 
introducing into the Act the concept of “material effect.”  This 
concept—either in those or related terms—is an essential 
element in nearly all of the financial services-related 
provisions of the SSCRA of 1918, as well as other 
provisions.102  This concept is discussed in greater detail 
below.103 
 The drafters’ intent to balance servicemember and 
commercial interests is also evidenced by the anti-evasion 
provision of the SSCRA of 1918.  This provision allowed 
courts to take action notwithstanding the provisions of the 
SSCRA if “it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court 
that any interest, property, or contract has since the date of 
the approval of this Act been transferred or acquired with 
intent to delay the just enforcement of such right by taking 
advantage of this Act . . . .”104  The drafters explained that 
 
 99. Id. § 300. 
 100. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 65-103, § 301, 40 Stat. 
440, 443–44. 
 101. Id. § 302. 
 102. See, e.g., id. §§ 200(4) (permitting vacation of default judgment if, in 
part, the person “was prejudiced by reason of his military service.”); 201 
(requiring stay unless servicemember “is not materially affected by reason of his 
military service.”); 300(2) (permitting stay of eviction proceedings unless court 
determines that the ability of tenant to pay rent “is not materially affected by 
reason of such military service.”); 301(2) (permitting stay of repossession 
proceedings unless court determines that the ability of the servicemember to 
comply with the contract “is not materially affected by reason of such service.”); 
302(2) (permitting stay of foreclosure proceedings unless court determines that 
the ability of the servicemember to comply with the contract “is not materially 
affected by reason of his military service.”). 
 103. See infra Part II.G. 
 104. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act § 600. 
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this provision “makes it useless for ingenious debtors to seek 
to obtain the benefits of this act by colorable transfers or 
assignments to persons who are or may become soldiers or 
sailors.”105  Thus, for example, a business entity could not 
avoid enforcement of an obligation by transferring a deed to 
one of its officers as the officer is entering military service.106  
By its terms, the Act expired six months after the end of 
World War I.107 
C. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 
 In 1940, as the United States prepared once again to 
enter a world war, the SSCRA was resurrected.108  The 1940 
version of the Act was virtually identical to the 1918 
version.109  As a result, the balancing of interests built into 
the 1918 Act remained intact. 
 When the 1940 Act was first enacted, it was widely 
approved.110  It soon became apparent, however, that the Act 
was insufficient to address changed social, military, and 
economic circumstances.111  Among these changes was the 
 
 105. Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore, supra note 78, at 213. 
 106. JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 69, § 2-8, at 2-11. 
 107. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act § 603, 40 Stat. at 449 (“[T]his Act 
shall remain in force until the termination of the war, and for six months 
thereafter . . . .”). 
 108. Act of Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 888, 54 Stat. 1178.  Great Britain similarly 
enacted legislation to protect servicemembers during World War II.  For a 
discussion of this legislation, see generally Rowland Frederick John Sanders, 
Wartime Relief from Civil Obligations in Great Britain, 227 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 62 (1943). 
 109. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 33 (2003) (noting that in 1940 
“Congress re-enacted the SSCRA almost verbatim.”); Amy J. McDonough, 
Gregory M. Huckabee & Christopher C. Gentile, Crisis of the Soldiers’ and 
Sailors’ Civil Relief Act: A Call for the Ghost of Major (Professor) John Wigmore, 
43 MERCER L. REV. 667, 670 (1992) (noting same); Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 
70, at 179.  Two of the most significant changes made in the 1940 SSCRA were 
the addition of a method for administering insurance protection and protections 
with respect to public lands, and an increase of the rent eviction ceiling from 
$50 to $80.  H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 33 (citing Civil Liabilities of Military 
Personnel: Hearing on S. 4270 Before the S. Comm. on Military Affairs, 76th 
Cong., vol. 2, 18 (1940)). 
 110. See, e.g., Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 181. 
 111. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 33 (2003) (“Within two years [of 1940] it 
became apparent that new social and business realities made a major update 
necessary.”); McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 670 (noting 
same); Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 181 (“At the time it was passed, it 
seemed adequate to meet the needs of men who were expected (by some 
Congressmen, at least) to remain in the services for one year of peaceful 
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realization that the increased duration of military service 
may impose substantial hardship on servicemembers whose 
military pay was significantly less than their civilian pay had 
been.112  Additionally, ambiguities in the SSCRA,113 and 
dissatisfaction in how the Act had been interpreted,114 
supplied additional motivation to modify the Act.  In response 
to these concerns, a team led by Major William Partlow, U.S. 
Army, JAGC, prepared amendments to the 1940 Act.115  
These amendments ultimately were passed in 1942.116 
 One of the most notable additions proposed by Maj. 
Partlow’s team was the creation of an interest rate ceiling.  
Under this provision, credit obligations incurred by a 
servicemember prior to military service could not accrue 
interest at a rate in excess of six percent annually.117  
Consistent with the 1918 Act’s balancing of interests, this 
benefit would not apply if the borrower’s ability to pay 
 
training.  The actualities of war have destroyed these pleasant illusions.  The 
army must be held intact, and it must grow.  More married men, and older men, 
whose financial problems demand a broad and comprehensive program of 
moratory relief, are being inducted.  The conflict may be protracted; it became 
obvious that the short period originally provided for payment by the soldier of 
his obligations upon his return from service, would not be enough.”).  The 
growing dissatisfaction with the SSCRA of 1940 is evidenced by the number of 
bills introduced between 1940 and 1942 to amend the Act.  See, e.g., Skilton, 
SSCRA, supra note 70, at 180 & n.15 (collecting bills). 
 112. See, e.g., 88 CONG. REC. 5368 (1942) (statement of Rep. Brooks) 
(explaining that the bill in part “arises from the differences in pay which a 
soldier receives and what the same man normally earns in civil life.”); Gregory 
M. Huckabee, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Resurrection of the 
Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 132 MIL. L. REV. 141, 146–47 (1991) 
(“Differences in pay was a key factor in Congress’s decision to provide special 
protection for indebtedness existing prior to call up to active duty.”). 
 113. Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 181 (noting ambiguities). 
 114. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. 
ARMY, JA 260, SOLDIERS’ AND SAILORS’ CIVIL RELIEF ACT GUIDE § 1-1, at 1-1 
(2000) [hereinafter JAG SSCRA GUIDE] (“In amending the Act [in 1942], 
Congress was motivated, in part, by the desire to override court decisions that, 
in some instances, had led to restrictive interpretations of the Act.”); see also S. 
REP. NO. 1558, at 2 (1942) (“[I]n some instances where there has been doubt as 
to whether particular transactions or proceedings are within the scope of the 
Civil Relief Act, a new section on language has been added for the purpose of 
clarification only and to carry out the original intent of the Congress, but with 
no intent to exclude from the provisions of the Act any transaction or proceeding 
now included.”). 
 115. McDonough, et al., supra note 109, at 670. 
 116. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942, Pub. L. No. 
77-732, 56 Stat. 769. 
 117. Id. § 206. 
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interest on the obligation “is not materially affected by reason 
of such [military] service.”118  The bill also included a new 
provision that would allow a court, in cases where the 
servicemember had received a stay of a foreclosure or 
repossession proceeding, to appoint a three-person panel to 
appraise the property and to order an amount “as may be 
just” be paid to the servicemember as a condition of 
foreclosure or repossession.119 
 The 1942 amendments were expressly designed to 
continue the balancing of interests established in the 1918 
and 1940 Acts.  Testifying before Congress regarding the bill 
that would become the 1942 amendments, Maj. Partlow 
“reaffirmed that the purpose of the Act was ‘toward the 
withholding of remedies, rather than the extinguishments of 
rights.’ ” 120  Recognizing this balancing of interests, one 
commentator at the time observed that the Act did not create 
an opportunity for servicemembers to avoid legitimate 
obligations; rather, it provides courts with discretion to 
provide temporary relief when military service materially 
affects a debtor’s ability to comply with obligations.121  The 
amendments were signed into law on October 6, 1942.122 
D. Developments Between 1942 and 2003 
 In the sixty years following the 1942 amendments, the 
balancing of servicemember and commercial interests 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. § 303.  The bill included other protections beyond the scope of this 
Article, including provisions allowing servicemembers to terminate leases in 
circumstances but allowing lessors to apply to a court for relief that “in the 
opinion of the court justice and equity may in the circumstances require,” id. § 
304, allowing courts to grant servicemembers anticipatory relief relating to a 
credit obligation, upon application from the servicemember, unless the court 
determines that the servicemember’s ability to comply with the terms of the 
obligation “has not been materially affected by reason of his military service,” 
id. § 700, and amendments relating to insurance, public lands, and others, id. 
arts. IV–V. 
 120. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 34 (2003) (quoting Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil 
Relief Act: Hearings on H.R. 7029 Before the H. Comm. on Military Affairs, 77th 
Cong. 11 (1942)). 
 121. M. R. Neifeld, Consumer Credit and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil 
Relief Act, 227 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 43, 45 (1943).  Prof. Neifeld 
also wrote that the SSCRA was “a social scientist’s dream come true” because it 
would give unique insights into issues related to consumer credit, such as the 
psychology of credit and credit judgment. 
 122. Skilton, SSCRA, supra note 70, at 182. 
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remained in place as the central concept of the Act.  The 
SSCRA of 1940, like the SSCRA of 1918, was designed to 
expire by its terms.  The SSCRA of 1940 was to remain in 
force until the later of May 15, 1945, or six months after the 
end of World War II.123  However, in 1948, after the SSCRA 
had expired, Congress passed the Military Selective Service 
Act, which contained a provision requiring the SSCRA to 
remain in force until it was “repealed or otherwise terminated 
by a subsequent Act of Congress.”124 
 Between 1942 and 2003, the SSCRA was amended 
twelve times (excluding the 1942 amendments discussed 
above).  The amendments were relatively discreet, and in 
general were designed to update the Act to a changing 
world.125  For example, to account for rising rents, Congress 
raised the rent ceiling in the SSCRA’s eviction protection 
from $80 to $150 in 1966,126 and from $150 to $1,200 in 
1991.127  Additionally, in response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, and the large number of National Guard 
members called to active duty to protect infrastructure assets, 
Congress extended SSCRA protections to National Guard 
members called to active duty under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) for at 
least thirty consecutive days.128  Notwithstanding these and 
other updates during these decades, a consensus began to 
develop as the twentieth century drew to a close that the 
 
 123. Act of Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 888, § 604, 54 Stat. 1178, 1191 (“This Act shall 
remain in force until May 15, 1945: [p]rovided, that should the United States be 
then engaged in a war, this Act shall remain in force until such war is 
terminated by a treaty of peace proclaimed by the President and for six months 
thereafter . . . .”) (emphasis in original). 
 124. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 758, ch. 625, tit. I, § 14, 62 
Stat. 604, 623; see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 35 (discussing extension of 
SSCRA). 
 125. See Huckabee, supra note 112, 154–57 (discussing the various 
amendments); see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 34–35 (summarizing 
amendments). 
 126. Act of Mar. 7, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-359, ch. 41, § 10, 80 Stat. 26, 28. 
 127. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-12,  § 2(a), 105 Stat. 34, 34. 
 128. Veterans Benefits Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-330, tit. III, § 305, 116 
Stat. 2820, 2821; see also J. Thomas Parker, Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief 
Act Now Applicable to the National Guard . . . Sort of, 2003 ARMY LAW. 17, 19 
(2003).  Curiously, the Department of Defense opposed the provision of SSCRA 
benefits to National Guard members.  See Duehring Statement, supra note 65, 
at 5, 136 (stating that the Department of Defense believed that state law, not 
federal, should apply to such duty). 
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SSCRA had become out of date.  In 1991, three commentators 
wrote that “[p]atchwork amendment repairs since 1942 have 
proven insufficient to keep the SSCRA in step with the 
explosion of modern day technology and societal demands and 
obligations. . . .  [M]ajor revision of the SSCRA must be 
undertaken to repair the armor that time has rusted.”129 
 One significant change in the military environment 
was the Department of Defense’s (DOD) initiation of the Total 
Force Policy.  When the Selective Service Act terminated in 
1973, effectively ending the draft, the DOD initiated the Total 
Force Policy which provided that reserve personnel, rather 
than draftees, would serve as the primary source of personnel 
to provide “surge” capabilities to the U.S. armed forces to 
allow the mobilization of large forces on short notice.130  In 
the following decades, the armed forces shifted more and 
more of its combat readiness resources to the reserves as a 
fiscal measure.131  As of 2012, the DOD reported that there 
were approximately 1.4 million active duty servicemembers 
and 850,000 National Guard and Reserve members.  In the 
years following implementation of the Total Force Policy, and 
especially during the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s, 
this shift from full-time military personnel to reserve 
personnel, and the difficulties faced by reservists called to 
active duty, raised concerns that the SSCRA did not 
adequately address the changing military and social 
environment.132 
 The consumer credit marketplace had also changed 
substantially.  Consumer credit products had become more 
pervasive and had changed substantially since 1918 and 
 
 129. McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 683–84; see also id. 
at 671 (“Many provisions that had offered protection to servicemembers seventy 
years ago were hopelessly out of date in 1991.”); Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil 
Relief Act and Veterans’ Reemployment Rights: Joint Hearing Before the Comms. 
on Veterans’ Affairs of the H.R. and U.S. Sen., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990) 
(statement of Rep. Smith) (“Since the Act was written at a time when our 
country was very different, both economically and socially, some of the 
provisions are fairly dated and perhaps needing revision.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Role of the Reserves in the Total Force Policy: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Readiness of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, at 2–3 (1989) 
(statement of Richard A. Davis, Dir., Army Issues, Nat’l Sec. & Int’l Affairs 
Div.). 
 131. See, e.g., id.; McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 668. 
 132. See, e.g., McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 668; 
Huckabee, supra note 112, at 142. 
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1942.133  For example, credit cards as they existed in the late 
twentieth century were unknown at the time of the First and 
Second World Wars.134  Thirty-year mortgages were also very 
rare.135  And the extensive leasing of automobiles and 
business equipment was a development the drafters of the 
original SSCRA could not have imagined.136  In short, the 
drafters of the 1918 Act and the 1942 amendments could not 
have foreseen the revolution in consumer financial products 
and services that had taken place by the end of the twentieth 
century. 
 Nevertheless, Congress did not make any changes to 
the SSCRA during the sixty years after the 1942 amendments 
that indicated any intent to depart from the policy of 
balancing servicemember and commercial interests first built 
into the SSCRA of 1918 and continued in the SSCRA of 1940.  
Indeed, shortly before the SSCRA was replaced by the SCRA, 
the SSCRA itself had remained very similar to the original 
1918 Act.137  Thus, as of 2002, it was still the view of many 
that the Act remained designed to protect both 
servicemembers and those to whom servicemembers owed 
obligations.  For example, Acting Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Craig W. Duehring testified before a subcommittee of 
the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs that Congress 
equitably addressed the challenges faced by servicemembers 
through “the Act’s skillfully crafted balance” among the 
nation’s need for a strong national defense, the 
servicemembers’ interests, and the interests of the 
servicemembers’ creditors.138  And this view was consistent 
with decades of court jurisprudence.139 
 
 133. See generally LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A 
CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT (1999) (discussing the evolution of 
consumer credit products and services throughout the twentieth century). 
 134. Id. at 72, 220, 292–93. 
 135. Id. at 280–83. 
 136. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 52 (2003) (quoting Duehring Statement, supra 
note 65, at 4, 134). 
 137. Memorandum from John T. Meixell, Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., 
U.S. Army, Legal Assistance Policy Div., Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 
Replaces Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act 1 (undated), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/
lamp/servicememberscivilreliefact.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 138. Duehring Statement, supra note 65, at 3, 133, quoted in H.R. REP. NO. 
108-81, at 51. 
 139. See, e.g., JAG SSCRA GUIDE, supra note 114, § 1-5, at 1-5 (“[T]he Act 
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E. The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003 
 The SCRA continued the decades-old policy of 
balancing servicemember and commercial interests.  The 
2003 legislation was the culmination of efforts dating back to 
as early as 1991 to clarify and modernize the SSCRA.140  
Much of the final SCRA reflects a proposed revision of the 
SSCRA prepared by the DOD in 1991 and updated in 2002.141  
These proposed revisions had three stated goals: (1) “ ‘ to 
make the Act easier to read and understand by clarifying its 
language and putting it in modern legislative drafting form;’ ”  
(2) “ ‘ to incorporate into the Act many years of judicial 
interpretation;’ ”  and (3) “ ‘ to update the Act to take into 
account generally accepted practice under its provisions and 
new developments in American life not envisioned by the 
original drafters.’ ” 142  In particular, changes in the financial 
products available to and utilized by servicemembers fueled 
the perception that a significant update to the Act was 
required.143  As the bill that eventually became the SCRA 
moved through the legislative process in 2002 and 2003, these 
goals remained.144 
 In addition to these goals, the drafters and sponsors of 
the bill intended to maintain the balance between 
servicemember and commercial interests.145  The report from 
 
‘may not be employed to enable one who had flouted his obligations in civilian 
life to obtain indefinite delay.’ ”  (quoting Franklin Soc’y for Home-Building & 
Sav. v. Flavin, 40 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583, aff’d, 50 N.E.2d 653, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 
786 (1943))); see also Diamond v. United States, 344 F.2d 703 (Ct. Cl. 1965); 
Keefe v. Spangenberg, 533 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1981). 
 140. See, e.g., Gregory M. Huckabee, Congress Does it Again—The Ghost of 
Major John Wigmore Returns!, FED. LAW., May 2004, at 22 (describing the 2003 
enactment of the SCRA as “a 12-year legislative pilgrimage into law.”). 
 141. Meixell, supra note 137, at 1. 
 142. Id. (quoting Memorandum from Colonel Steven T. Strong, Dir., Legal 
Policy, Office of the Sec’y of Def. (Pers. & Readiness), to Serv. Legal Assistance 
Chiefs (Oct. 3, 2001)). 
 143. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 52 (2003). 
 144. See, e.g., id. at 35 (noting that the bill was intended to clarify and 
modernize the SSCRA). 
 145. See, e.g., id. at 51 (“H.R. 5111 [the bill that formed the basis of the 
SCRA of 2003] maintains this important balance [between servicemember and 
commercial interests] while addressing three areas where our experience with 
the Act indicates that change is needed: clarifying and simplifying the language; 
incorporating generally accepted procedures; and updating the Act to reflect 60 
years of change in America.” (quoting Duehring Statement, supra note 65, at 4, 
134)); Eugene J. Kelly, Jr., John L. Ropiequet & Sharilee Smentek, 
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the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs accompanying the 
SCRA legislation noted that Congress’s intent with the 2003 
legislation was the same as it was in 1940.146  On the floor of 
the House, Rep. Chris Smith of New Jersey, the author of the 
House bill, emphasized that “the act is intended to give a 
temporary reprieve to a servicemember and that it reflects 
the need to be fair to all parties . . . .”147  In the proposed 
legislation, courts would serve the same role they had in the 
1918 and 1940 versions of the Act, and the concept of 
“material effect” remained in existing protections and was 
expanded to new protections.148  Rather than changing the 
purpose of the Act and the balance between interests built 
into it, Congress was focused on clarifying and modernizing 
the Act.149  The SCRA became law on December 19, 2003.150 
F. Post-2003 Amendments 
 In the years since the 2003 enactment of the SCRA, 
the Act’s financial protections—and the balancing of interests 
built into them—have undergone few changes.  One 
significant change was implemented in 2008 by the Housing 
and Economic Recovery Act (HERA).151  HERA extended the 
duration of the interest rate benefit for mortgage loans to a 
 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003: Old Wine in a New Bottle?, 59 
CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 362, 363 (2005) (discussing same). 
 146. S. REP. NO. 108-197, at 7 (2003). 
 147. 149 CONG. REC. H3697 (daily ed. May 7, 2003) (statement of Rep. 
Smith). 
 148. See, e.g., H.R. 100, 108th Cong. §§ 201–02, 204, 207, 301–03, 305, 701 
(1st Sess. 2003), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 1–21.  Much of the bill 
considered in the Senate, S. 1136, was “identical to—or at least similar in 
substance to—provisions contained in H.R. 100,” so much so that the Senate 
committee declined to discuss most of the provisions of S. 1136 because it would 
be duplicative of the House report.  S. REP. NO. 108-197, at 7–8 (2003). 
 149. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 32 (2003) (“[T]he Committee believes 
the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act (SSCRA) should be restated and 
strengthened to ensure that its protections meet their needs in the 21st 
century.”). 
 150. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Amendments of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-189, 117 Stat. 2835; see also Susan H. Seabury & Jack F. Williams, 
Bankruptcy and Debt Under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 2008 ANN. 
SURV. BANKR. L. 445 (noting that the differences between the House and Senate 
bills were negotiated without need of committee). 
 151. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 
Stat. 2847. 
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servicemember’s period of military service plus one year,152 
and the duration of the foreclosure protection after a 
servicemember leaves military service from ninety days to 
nine months.153  In 2012, this protection period was further 
extended from nine months to one year.154  Aside from 
changing the duration of these protections, HERA did not 
otherwise amend the SCRA. 
 The SCRA was subsequently amended by the 
Veterans’ Benefits Act of 2010 (VBA).155  Prior to the 
enactment of the VBA, the SCRA did not expressly provide 
private rights of action for servicemembers to enforce SCRA 
provisions—although courts had generally held that the 
SCRA did provide private rights of action.156  The VBA 
amended the SCRA expressly to permit private rights of 
actions.157  The VBA also amended the SCRA to provide that 
the U.S. Attorney General is authorized to enforce the SCRA 
and seek civil monetary penalties of up to $55,000 for a first 
violation of the Act, and penalties of up to $110,000 for 
subsequent violations.158 
 These post-2003 amendments left the provisions that 
balanced the interests of servicemembers and commercial 
interests intact.  To date, the SCRA retains the interest-
balancing structure that was originally implemented in the 
1918 Act. 
 
 152. Id. § 2203(b). 
 153. Id. § 2203(a).  HERA also provided that this protection would sunset on 
Dec. 31, 2010.  Id. § 2203(c).  On Dec. 29, 2010, the expiration date was 
extended until Dec. 31, 2012.  Helping Heroes Keep Their Homes Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-346, § 2, 124 Stat. 3622, 3622. 
 154. Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families 
Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-154, § 710(a), 126 Stat. 1165, 1208.  Unless 
otherwise amended, this extension of time is set to expire on Dec. 31, 2014.  Id. 
§ 710(d). 
 155. Veterans Benefits Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-275, 124 Stat. 2864. 
 156. See, e.g., Lt. Col. Conrad, Federal Court Rules that Military Members 
Have a Private Cause of Action Under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 
ARMY LAW, July 1998, at 63. 
 157. Veterans Benefits Act § 303(a); H.R. REP. NO. 111-324, at 17 (2009). 
 158. Veterans Benefits Act § 303(a); H.R. REP. NO. 111-324, at 17.  
Additionally, the VBA amended the lease provisions of the SCRA to prohibit 
early termination charges.  Veterans Benefits Act § 301; see also H.R. REP. NO. 
111-324, at 17. 
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G. The Central Concept: Material Effect 
 The concept of “material effect” is the central equitable 
concept in the SCRA, and the primary means by which the 
balancing of servicemember and commercial interests is 
achieved.159  This concept has been the principal component of 
the balancing of interests since the first SSCRA was enacted 
in 1918.  It was designed to ensure that the protections and 
benefits of the SSCRA would apply only when the 
servicemember was geographically or economically prejudiced 
by military service.  For example, Major/Professor John 
Wigmore explained that the “material effect” standard was 
not intended to protect those whose noncompliance with 
credit obligations was unrelated to military service; instead, 
“[w]e have tried to hitch up those provisions so that no relief 
shall be given to any person in the military service, unless he 
needs the relief, just because he is in military service.”160  In 
other words, “material effect” is limited to difficulties caused 
by military service, not merely difficulties experienced while 
in military service.  Or, to use a sports metaphor, the SCRA 
“does not excuse a servicemember from his/her obligations, 
but it will level the playing field so that military personnel 
are not disadvantaged because of their commitment to our 
nation.”161 
 With respect to the financial protections, the concept 
of material effect is generally raised in two, sometimes 
interconnected, ways: geographic prejudice (i.e., military 
service impairs the servicemember’s ability to protect his or 
her rights because of where the servicemember is stationed); 
and economic prejudice (i.e., military service, including the 
possibility of reduced income, impairs the servicemember’s 
ability to meet financial obligations).162  Thus, a 
servicemember serving overseas who is sued in the United 
States likely is materially affected in his or her ability to 
defend the case; but a servicemember serving in the 
continental United States who is sued in a court located just 
 
 159. See, e.g., Kathleen H. Switzer, Mortgage Defaults and the Soldiers’ and 
Sailors’ Civil Relief Act: Assigning the Burden of Proof When Applying the 
Material Effect Test, 18 REAL ESTATE L.J., 171, 173–74 (1989). 
 160. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Bill: Hearing on S. 2859 and H.R. 
6361 Before the S. Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 217 (1917). 
 161. JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 69, § 1-2, at 1-3. 
 162. Id. § 3-3, at 3-8 to -9. 
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minutes from the base where he or she is serving likely would 
not be.163  Similarly, a physician who is called to military 
service and whose income is dramatically reduced as a result 
may be materially affected in his or her ability to comply with 
a credit obligation; but a person who is unemployed and then 
called into military service may not be.164 
 To best serve the balancing of interests between 
parties, the Supreme Court has held that courts must be 
flexible in applying the material effect test.165  In particular, 
the Court declined to specify which party has the burden to 
establish material effect, concluding that courts should have 
discretion to allocate the burden on a case-by-case basis.166  
Thus, in many cases, the burden may fall on the 
servicemember to prove material effect, rather than on a 
creditor to disprove it.167  Prior to the enactment of the SCRA 
in 2003, some urged Congress to further define “material 
effect.”168  The final Act did not contain such a definition, 
however.  The House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 
explained that this was because the Committee concluded 
that “courts, in considering the facts and circumstances of 
 
 163. Id. § 3-3, at 3-8 to -9 (noting that military service often may have no 
more impact on a servicemember’s ability to protect his or her rights than would 
any other pursuit, and that “[l]ike any other citizen, the servicemember may 
have to work through an attorney.”); see also Cornell Leasing Corp. v. 
Hemmingway, 553 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1990) (finding that defendant 
failed to show prejudice where servicemember lived in vicinity of court and 
status as reserve or active duty military was unclear); Burgess v. Burgess, 234 
N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).  In this case, the servicemember was stationed 
where “he was always accessible to the court” and had been “fully informed of 
the pendency of the action.”  Id. at 89.  The court concluded he was not 
materially affected by reason of his military service in his ability to participate 
in the action. 
 164. See, e.g., Creamer v. Ansoplano, 52 N.Y.S.2d 862 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945) 
(noting that a pattern of compliance begun before the debtor’s induction into 
military service supports the conclusion that military service did not materially 
affect the debtor’s ability to comply with the obligation).  But see Fourte v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 07-cv-1363, 2009 WL 2998110, at *3–4 
(D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2009) (holding that mere potential of increased civilian income 
supported finding of material effect even though military income was higher 
than actual civilian income). 
 165. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 569 (1943). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Some have argued that the burden of proof should never be on the 
servicemember.  See, e.g., Lanourra L. Phillips, The Servicemembers Civil 
“______” Act: Giving the Act the “Relief” It Deserves, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 103 
(2008). 
 168.  H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 36 (2003). 
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specific cases, have generally interpreted the term in ways 
that are consistent with the intent of the Act as Major 
Wigmore explained it.”169 
III. THE SCRA AND AGGRESSIVE ENFORCEMENT 
 Notwithstanding the abundant evidence in the 
structure and history of the SCRA and its predecessors 
regarding the central role the balancing of servicemember 
and creditor interests plays in the statutory scheme, recent 
government enforcement actions have given short shrift to 
this balancing of interests.  Instead, government agencies 
have focused exclusively on short-term benefits to 
servicemembers, without apparent regard to the costs to, and 
burdens on, creditors or to potential long-term costs to 
servicemembers.  And acting with this focus, the agencies 
have aggressively expanded their interpretation of the SCRA 
in ways that are not only inconsistent with the purpose and 
structure of the SCRA, but also in several cases inconsistent 
with the statutory text.  And in at least some cases, the 
agencies acknowledged that the remedies provided under the 
settlements exceeded the requirements of the SCRA itself.170  
As one may expect from a retroactive application of newly-
expanded interpretations of a statute, these enforcement 
actions have resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in 
remediation and penalties. 
 Thus, the government agencies’ conduct in these 
enforcement actions is consistent with the bureaucratic 
tendencies discussed in Part I above.  This part will examine 
in more detail the positions taken by the government agencies 
in their SCRA enforcement actions, illustrating how the 
agencies’ conduct is consistent with the observations of 
regulatory theory.  In particular, this part will focus on 
several of the agencies’ positions that constitute significant 
expansions of the standards established by the SCRA.  First, 
it will discuss the agencies’ adoption of a strict liability theory 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, $25 Billion Mortgage Servicing 
Agreement Filed in Federal Court (Mar. 12, 2012) (“The consent judgments 
provide enhanced protections for service members that go beyond those required 
by the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA).”), available at 
https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Settlement-USDOJ-FILING-news-
release.pdf. 
88 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 55 
for alleged SCRA violations, and examine the flaws in the 
reasoning supporting this position.  It will then discuss 
specific positions on two central SCRA protections—the 
protection regarding default judgments and the interest rate 
cap—and show how the agencies’ positions are departures 
from the text and purpose of the Act.  Finally, it will discuss 
how the agencies’ positions are incompatible with the rule of 
lenity, which applies to the SCRA as it does to other hybrid 
civil-criminal statutes. 
A. Strict Liability: A New Standard 
 Perhaps the agencies’ most dramatic departure from 
the SCRA’s purpose and structure—and the starkest example 
of the tendency to adopt expansive interpretations of the 
law—is the imposition of civil liability for alleged SCRA 
violations on a strict liability theory.  The adoption of strict 
liability under the SCRA first occurred not in an agency 
enforcement action, but in a civil action brought by the 
Department of Justice against a towing company.  In United 
States v. B.C. Enterprises, Inc.,171 the DOJ brought a civil 
action against three defendants alleging that the sale of 
twenty vehicles owned by active-duty servicemembers at 
auction violated the SCRA’s protection against the 
enforcement of storage liens without court orders.172  The 
defendants argued that they exercised due diligence in 
enforcing their storage liens and therefore could not be liable, 
whereas the DOJ argued that the applicable standard is strict 
liability.173  The court, recognizing this was a case of first 
impression, ruled against the defendants and held that strict 
liability is the standard.174  The court reasoned that the 
language in the SCRA’s storage lien provision closely 
resembled language in other strict liability statutes.175  The 
court also looked to dicta from a then-recent case, as well as a 
1918 case construing the SSCRA, and concluded that those 
cases further supported the strict liability view.176  Noting 
that the SCRA’s interest rate cap required the servicemember 
 
 171. United States v. B.C. Enters., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 172. Id. at 653. 
 173. Id. at 662. 
 174. Id. at 662–63. 
 175. Id. at 662. 
 176. Id. at 662–63. 
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to provide written notice and a copy of military orders to be 
eligible for the protection, and that the storage lien provision 
contained no such requirement, the court concluded that 
strict liability was supported by the structure of the SCRA.177  
Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s factual evidence 
that it is not possible to verify accurately a vehicle owner’s 
military status.178  While the court acknowledged that “the 
inadvertent sale of servicemembers’ vehicles may occasionally 
be unavoidable,” the court concluded that the defendant could 
simply obtain a court order in every case before selling a 
vehicle.179  Thus, the court concluded, “even if the Defendants 
exercised the utmost care in investigating their victims’ 
military status, they face liability for their actions.”180 
 The B.C. Enterprises decision has formed the basis for 
the position taken by the DOJ, the federal banking agencies, 
and the state attorneys general that the SCRA is a strict 
liability statute181—and is therefore worthy of further 
examination.  Ultimately, the agencies’ reliance on B.C. 
Enterprises is misplaced.182  First, the question of whether the 
SCRA is a strict liability statute itself reflects a 
misunderstanding of the SCRA’s (and SSCRA’s) scheme of 
balancing servicemember and creditor interests.  The Act was 
 
 177. United States v. B.C. Enters., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 (E.D. Va. 
2009). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 663–64. 
 181. Statement of Amber Standridge, Trial Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Women in Housing and Finance Brown Bag 
Lunch (June 8, 2011) (stating that B.C. Enterprises provides the basis for the 
DOJ’s determination that the SCRA is a strict liability statute); In the author’s 
experience in representing many clients in numerous SCRA reviews conducted 
by independent consultants (“ICs”) required by various SCRA-related consent 
orders, the ICs have reported receiving this guidance from enforcement 
agencies.  To the author’s knowledge, this guidance has not previously been 
made public by any of the enforcement agencies.  This Article references this 
informal and non-public guidance to the ICs as “IC Guidance” hereinafter. 
 182. Following B.C. Enterprises, courts are split regarding whether the 
SCRA’s provisions support a strict liability theory.  Roberts v. Chips Express, 
Inc., No. 12-cv-42-JPS, 2012 WL 4866495, at *3–5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 12, 2012) 
(finding strict liability); Gordon v. Pete’s Auto Serv., 837 F. Supp. 2d 581, 585 
(E.D. Va. 2011) (finding same); but see Frazier v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 
8:08-cv-02396–T–24-TGW, 2009 WL 4015574, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2009) 
(holding that the SCRA does not impose strict liability on a servicemember who 
inadvertently overcharges a servicemember under the interest rate cap but then 
corrects the error). 
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not designed to create liability except in cases where a 
creditor acted knowingly in a manner inconsistent with the 
Act’s protections.183  Instead, the Act was designed to preserve 
the status quo while a servicemember was in military service 
unless a court found that military service did not materially 
affect the servicemember’s ability to protect his or her 
interests.184  The imposition of civil liability in cases where a 
creditor had no knowledge, constructive or otherwise, of a 
servicemember’s eligibility for protection is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the SCRA’s structure and purpose. 
 Reliance on B.C. Enterprises is further misplaced 
because of the many flaws in the court’s reasoning.  For 
example, the B.C. Enterprises court relied on the 1918 case of 
Hoffman v. Charlestown Five Cent Sav. Bank,185 which 
analyzed the SSCRA’s provision providing foreclosure 
protection.  The Hoffman court was asked to provide relief for 
(i.e., to unwind) a foreclosure, not to impose civil liability.186  
The defendant in Hoffman argued that it did not know or 
have any reason to know that an owner of the property was in 
military service (and, indeed, the servicemember held 
equitable title only), and therefore the foreclosure was 
valid.187  The court rejected this argument, concluding that 
when the SSCRA said that “[n]o sale under a power of 
sale . . . shall be valid if made during the period of military 
service” except upon court order, that applied in all cases 
even if the bank had no notice.188  The court concluded that 
 
 183. See, e.g., Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 531(c) (2003) 
(providing for criminal liability if a person “knowingly” evicts or attempts to 
evict a person inconsistent with the sections protections); id. § 532(b) 
(discussing same regarding foreclosures). 
 184. See, e.g., id. § 502(2) (“The purposes of this Act are— . . . to provide for 
the temporary suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and 
transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during 
their military service.”); see also supra notes 81–91 and accompanying text; L. 
Sue Hayn, Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Update, 1989 ARMY LAW. 40, 40 
(1989) (“Congress attempted to preserve the status quo during the conflict by 
permitting the service member to delay these actions until circumstances 
allowed the service member to return to defend endangered interests.”). 
 185. Hoffman v. Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, 121 N.E. 15 (Mass. 
1918). 
 186. Id. at 16. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (citing Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 65-103, § 
302(3), 40 Stat. 440, 444 (1918)). 
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since the owner of the property was in military service, and 
since the foreclosure had been effected without court order, 
the foreclosure was not valid and granted relief to the 
servicemember.189  In other words, and consistent with the 
SSCRA’s structure and balancing of interests, the court 
returned the parties to the status quo ex ante.  Hoffman 
supports the proposition that a court can return the parties to 
the positions they were in prior to the servicemember’s 
military service even if the creditor was unaware of that 
military service; but it does not support the proposition that 
liability may be imposed on a creditor who acts without such 
knowledge. 
 The B.C. Enterprises holding is further flawed because 
the court misunderstood the structure of the SCRA.  The 
court noted that the SCRA requires a servicemember to 
submit written notice and a copy of military orders to a 
creditor to become eligible for the interest rate cap.190  The 
court reasoned that the absence of such a requirement in the 
storage lien protection suggested Congress intended that the 
protection apply even if the servicemember did not notify the 
lienholder.191  This reasoning overlooks the purpose of the 
requirement for notice and a copy of military orders in the 
interest rate cap provision.  The interest rate cap limits the 
rate of interest on certain credit obligations during a 
servicemember’s period of military service.192  The benefit can 
be requested retroactively back to the date the servicemember 
first became eligible, up until 180 days after the 
servicemember leaves military service.193  But for a creditor to 
apply the benefit retroactively, the creditor must know when 
the servicemember’s military service started.  Prior to the 
2003 enactment of the SCRA, the SSCRA did not provide 
guidance regarding how a servicemember should request the 
SCRA benefit.194  During congressional hearings in 1990, 
witnesses informed the House and Senate Committees on 
Veterans’ Affairs that creditors were generally requesting a 
 
 189. Id. at 16–17. 
 190. United States v. B.C. Enters., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 (E.D. Va. 
2009) (citing Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(b)(1) (2006)). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act § 527(a)(1). 
 193. Id. § 527(b)(1). 
 194. Id. § 526; H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 39 (2003). 
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written statement requesting the benefit and a copy of the 
orders calling the servicemember to military service which 
showed when military service commenced.195  In its 2003 
report explaining the bill that eventually became the SCRA, 
the House Committee on Veterans Affairs clarified that the 
bill would modify the interest rate cap provision to codify the 
practices discussed during the 1990 hearings.196  The 
Committee explained that this requirement to submit orders 
was designed to show when a servicemember begins military 
service—information essential for proper implementation of 
the interest rate cap.197  Since this requirement is designed to 
provide creditors with information about the period of time a 
servicemember was in military service—information relevant 
to the interest rate protection, but less relevant to other 
protections—it is not surprising that other SCRA provisions 
would not include such requirements.  And accordingly, the 
absence of such a requirement in other provisions does not 
support a conclusion that those other provisions provide for 
strict liability. 
 Reliance on B.C. Enterprises is also misplaced because 
the court erred in concluding that hardship to creditors is not 
relevant to a determination of whether a provision imposes 
strict liability.198  A statutory interpretation that renders 
compliance impossible is precisely the type of absurd result 
courts should avoid.199  In many cases, it is impossible for a 
creditor to determine if a borrower or lessee is a 
servicemember.  Even though the Department of Defense has 
created a website that allows creditors with certain 
information to determine whether a person is in military 
 
 195. See, e.g., Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act and Veterans’ 
Reemployment Rights: Joint Hearing Before the Comms. on Veterans’ Affairs of 
the H.R. and U.S. Sen., supra note 129, at 186–87 (statement of Thomas J. 
Hughes, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Navy Fed. Credit Union). 
 196. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 39 (“Section 207 would codify the practices 
established during the Persian Gulf War.”). 
 197. Id. at 39 (“These orders indicate the period of time for which the 
servicemember is called to duty.”). 
 198. See supra notes 173–84 and accompanying text. 
 199. See, e.g., In re Fed.-Mogul Global, Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 370 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting interpretation as “absurd” where compliance with that interpretation 
would be impossible in some instances); Alt. Aviation Servs. Inc. v. Meggitt 
(UK) Ltd., 207 F. App’x 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); Sandler ex rel. Sandler 
v. Hickey, 5 F. App’x 233, 236 (4th Cir. 2001) (same). 
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service,200 there are many people who might be eligible for 
SCRA protection that either would not appear in the database 
or for whom a creditor/lessor would not have the necessary 
information to perform the search.  For example, the SCRA’s 
eviction protection applies to dependents as well as to 
servicemembers.201  But there is no database available to 
creditors or lessors providing information about whether a 
particular individual is the dependent of a servicemember.  
Additionally, the SCRA extends benefits to U.S. citizens 
serving in the armed forces of an allied nation.202  There is at 
present no database available to creditors or lessors that 
would provide information on people serving in this capacity.  
Adopting a strict liability interpretation of such provisions 
would place creditors and lessors in a position where 
compliance would be impossible unless the servicemember 
notified the creditor of his or her military service. 
 The B.C. Enterprises court’s response to the argument 
about impossibility of compliance is similarly flawed.  The 
court stated that compliance with the SCRA’s storage lien 
protection could be achieved simply by conducting all auction 
sales pursuant to court order.203  But such an interpretation 
would have the effect of reading the SCRA to preempt all 
laws permitting lien holders to exercise their liens without 
obtaining a court order.  There is no authority to support the 
position that Congress intended the SCRA or its predecessors 
to preempt or otherwise invalidate all laws that allow 
lienholders, secured parties, or landlords from availing 
themselves of laws permitting them to exercise their rights 
outside of court.  And without such authority, the court’s 
interpretation is inconsistent with the interpretive canon that 
courts should avoid interpreting a statute so as to implicitly 
preempt other laws.204 
 Finally, whatever merit the B.C. Enterprises court’s 
analysis of the text of the storage lien protection may have, 
that analysis is inapplicable to other SCRA provisions.  The 
 
 200. See infra notes 252–267 and accompanying text. 
 201. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 531 (2012). 
 202. Id. § 514. 
 203. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 204. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“We tend to interpret federal statutes in a way that avoids implied 
preemption.”). 
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B.C. Enterprises court focused on the language in the storage 
lien provision prohibiting the enforcement of a storage lien 
without court order,205 and concluded that this language 
sufficiently resembled other strict liability statutes to support 
a conclusion that the SCRA’s storage lien protection imposed 
strict liability.206  But many other provisions in the SCRA are 
not phrased in terms of a prohibition as is the storage lien 
provision; instead, they simply provide that the action taken 
is invalid.  For example, the SCRA’s foreclosure protection 
does not provide that a creditor “may not” foreclose on a 
mortgage because of default, but provides that a foreclosure 
“shall not be valid” if made during the servicemember’s period 
of eligibility.207  The text of the foreclosure protection does not 
establish a prohibition that can be violated; rather, it 
provides that a foreclosure that is not pursuant to a court 
order or written waiver is not valid.  In other words, 
consistent with the SCRA’s balancing of interests, it returns 
the parties to the status quo ex ante.  This confusion appears 
to have been exacerbated by the 2010 amendment to the 
statute authorizing the Attorney General and private 
plaintiffs to bring civil actions for “violations” of the Act.208  It 
is axiomatic that a “violation” can exist only where a 
requirement or prohibition exists to be violated.209  In statutes 
that do not contain requirements or prohibitions—as is the 
case in many SCRA provisions—there is simply no provision 
to violate.  Where a provision of the Act is designed to return 
parties to the status quo ex ante, the remedy is a return to 
that position—not the imposition of civil penalties under a 
strict liability theory.  But as discussed above, the imposition 
of civil penalties is consistent with regulatory theory’s 
observations regarding an agency’s incentives to seek large 
financial remedies. 
 
 205. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act § 537(a)(1) (“A person holding a lien on 
the property or effects of a servicemember may not . . . foreclose or enforce any 
lien on such property or effects without a court order . . . .”). 
 206. United States v. B.C. Enters., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 650, 662 (E.D. Va. 
2009) (citing Md. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Kellum, 51 F.3d 1220, 1225 (4th Cir. 
1995)). 
 207. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 533(c) (2012). 
 208. Id. §§ 597–597a; see also supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text. 
 209. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1705 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“violation” as including “the contravention of a right or duty.”). 
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B. Strict Liability in Government Enforcement 
 Notwithstanding the flaws in the B.C. Enterprises 
decision and its inconsistencies with the SCRA’s purpose and 
structure (as well as its limitation to storage liens), the DOJ, 
the federal banking agencies, and the state attorneys general 
have settled over twenty enforcement actions and imposed 
hundreds of millions of dollars in civil liability since 2011 
under the SCRA’s foreclosure and repossession protections 
applying the strict liability theory first articulated in B.C. 
Enterprises.  This approach is inconsistent with the historical 
understanding of the statute,210 as well as the statutory text 
and the balancing of interests built into the Act.  To be 
consistent with the statutory text and structure, a violation 
should be found only where a person acts contrary to an 
express requirement or prohibition.  But while inconsistent 
with the statutory text and structure, this expansion of 
liability is consistent with the bureaucratic tendencies toward 
maximizing financial recovery, expanding the reach of the 
statutes the agencies administer, and agency tunnel vision. 
 The strict liability theory was first applied in SCRA 
enforcement actions against financial institutions in 2011.211  
In April of that year, the federal banking agencies entered 
into settlements with fourteen federally-regulated mortgage 
servicers.212  These settlements addressed a range of 
 
 210. See, e.g., Kathleen H. Switzer, Benefits for Reserve and National Guard 
Members Under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, 110 BANKING 
L.J. 517, 526 (1993) (“Regardless of the type of relief that is available, borrowers 
have an obligation to notify their banks that they are on active duty.  Thus, 
banks have no duty to seek out those who might be eligible for relief but should 
be prepared to handle requests for relief and inquiries regarding the SSCRA.”). 
 211. The DOJ resolved an enforcement action in 2008 against Homecomings 
Financial, LLC.  That case involved a prepayment penalty against a single 
servicemember, which Homecomings ultimately agreed to waive.  The strict 
liability issue was not raised.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Justice 
Department Resolves Investigation Under Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 
Homecomings Financial, LLC (Dec. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crt-1108.html. 
 212. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal 
Reserve issues enforcement actions related to deficient practices in residential 
mortgage loan servicing (Apr. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20110413a.htm; 
Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, OCC Takes Enforcement Action Against Eight Servicers for Unsafe 
and Unsound Foreclosure Practices (Apr. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-47.html; 
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foreclosure-related practices, including allegations of SCRA 
violations.213  To identify the alleged foreclosure-related 
violations, the settlements required the mortgage servicers to 
engage independent consultants (ICs) to conduct a 
comprehensive foreclosure review process known as the 
Independent Foreclosure Review (IFR).214  As part of the IFR, 
the ICs were required to review loans for SCRA compliance.215  
And in guidance provided by the federal banking agencies to 
the ICs, the agencies instructed the ICs that the SCRA is a 
strict liability statute and has no safe harbors.216  The federal 
banking agencies subsequently agreed to terminate the IFR 
in exchange for compensation and other relief to borrowers 
totaling $9.3 billion.217 
 This strict liability theory was applied one month later 
in another two foreclosure-related settlements: one between 
the Department of Justice and Countrywide (through its 
successor-in-interest), and the other between the DOJ and 
Saxon Mortgage Servicing.218  These settlements involved 
allegations that the servicers had foreclosed on SCRA-eligible 
borrowers without a court order or written waiver from the 
servicemembers.  In the complaints, the DOJ alleged that the 
servicers “had actual or constructive notice of the military 
 
Press Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS 11-008, OTS Takes Action to 
Correct Foreclosure Deficiencies (Apr. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/press-releases/ots-pr-2011-08.pdf. 
 213. Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency & 
Office of Thrift Supervision, Interagency Review of Foreclosure Policies and 
Practices, at 3, 7, 11 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-47a.pdf. 
 214. E.g., Consent Order at art. VII, In re Citibank, N.A., No. AA-EC-11-13 
(Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 2011).  The IFR was 
subsequently the source of substantial public criticism.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-550T, FORECLOSURE REVIEW, LESSONS 
LEARNED COULD ENHANCE CONTINUING REVIEWS AND ACTIVITIES UNDER 
AMENDED CONSENT ORDERS: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON HOUS., 
TRANSP., AND CMTY. DEV., COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 
U.S. S. (2013) (statement of Lawrance L. Evans, Jr., Director, Fin. Mkts. and 
Cmty. Inv.) (criticizing the IFR process and oversight). 
 215. E.g, Citibank, N.A., supra note 214, art. VII, ¶ 3(b) (requiring the 
servicer to determine whether each foreclosure was in accordance with 
applicable law “including but not limited to SCRA.”). 
 216. IC Guidance, supra note 181 
 217. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 29. 
 218. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice 
Department Settles with Bank of America and Saxon Mortgage for Illegally 
Foreclosing on Servicemembers (May 26, 2011). 
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service” of many of the servicemembers—indicating that the 
servicers had no notice of military service, either actual or 
constructive, in many other cases and that liability was being 
imposed under a strict liability theory.219  The parties 
collectively agreed to settle the allegations for a total of over 
$61 million.220 
 The application of strict liability was continued with 
the SCRA allegations that were part of the National 
Mortgage Settlement (NMS) between the nation’s five largest 
mortgage servicers and the DOJ and forty-nine state 
attorneys general (AGs).221  Among the various foreclosure-
related allegations in the NMS, the DOJ and state AGs also 
alleged a variety of SCRA violations.222  These allegations 
show that the DOJ and state AGs continued the application of 
the strict liability theory.  For example, the complaint alleges 
that the mortgage servicers “failed to determine consistently 
and accurately the military status of borrowers in 
foreclosure.”223  In other words, in many cases the agencies 
acknowledged that the mortgage servicers were not aware of 
the borrower’s military service and, therefore, of the 
borrower’s potential SCRA eligibility. 
 Shortly after the NMS, the DOJ and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) announced they had 
 
 219. Compl. ¶ 7, United States v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 11-cv-
04534 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2011).  The Saxon complaint was more specific, 
alleging only that Saxon “had actual or constructive notice of the military 
service of at least ten of the seventeen servicemembers”—indicating that Saxon 
had no notice, either actual or constructive, of military service for as many as 
40% of the borrowers.  Compl. ¶ 7, United States v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 
No. 3:11-cv-01111-F (N.D. Tex. May 26, 2011). 
 220. Consent Order ¶ 18, BAC Home Loans Servicing, No. 11-cv-04534 (C.D. 
Cal. May 31, 2011); Consent Order ¶ 17, Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 3:11-cv-
01111-F (N.D. Tex. May 26, 2011).  Subsequently, the DOJ announced an 
additional $39 million in payments under these consent orders.  Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Service Members to Receive $39 Million for Violations of 
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (Apr. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/April/13-crt-383.html. 
 221. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 170. 
 222. Compl. ¶¶ 97–101, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:12-cv-
00361 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2012) (alleging various SCRA violations); Consent 
Judgment, supra note 40, ¶ 11, Ex. A at 32–35, Ex. H at 2, 8, 10–11 (imposing 
various requirements regarding SCRA issues and requiring extensive review of 
files for SCRA issues). 
 223. Compl., supra note 222, ¶ 97. 
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entered into settlements with Capital One.224  Unlike 
previous settlements, this settlement was not limited to 
foreclosure-related issues but also included allegations 
related to auto lending and the application of the SCRA’s 
interest rate benefit to various types of credit products.225  
With the exception of the interest rate protection, which the 
DOJ and the OCC acknowledged required the servicemember 
to submit written notice and a copy of military orders to 
qualify, the other protections were again enforced under a 
strict liability theory.226  The DOJ’s press release announced 
that the settlement would be for approximately $12 million,227 
but the settlement agreements required compensation to 
borrowers based on a formula applied to the results of the file 
review.228 
 In September 2013, the OCC announced a settlement 
with three banks regarding SCRA benefits and protections.229  
The settlement resolved allegations that the banks failed to 
comply with the SCRA’s interest rate cap and with various 
other SCRA protections, including the default judgment 
protection, in the banks’ collections activities.230  Again, the 
OCC took the position that the SCRA is a strict liability 
statute.231  The settlement required the bank to provide an 
undisclosed amount of compensation to affected consumers.232 
 
 224. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice 
Department Reaches $12 Million Settlement to Resolve Violations of the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act by Capital One (July 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-ag-933.html; Press Release, Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, OCC Takes Actions 
Against Capital One to Assure Servicemembers Receive Credit Protections for 
Their Mortgages and Other Loans (July 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-115.html. 
 225. Consent Order ¶ 1, United States v. Capital One, N.A., No. 1:12-cv-
00828 (E.D. Va. July 27, 2012). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See supra note 224. 
 228. Consent Order, supra note 220, ¶¶ 36–51. 
 229. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of 
the Treasury, OCC Takes Action Against JPMC to Protect Consumers and to 
Ensure Servicemembers Receive Credit Protections for Their Non-Home Loans 
(Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-
releases/2013/nr-occ-2013-139.html. 
 230. Consent Order, In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. AA-EC-13-76 
(Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 2013). 
 231. Id. at art. I, ¶ 1(f). 
 232. Id. 
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 Most recently, the DOJ and FDIC announced 
settlements with Sallie Mae regarding the SCRA’s interest 
rate benefit and default judgment protections.233  The 
settlement resolved allegations that Sallie Mae failed to 
comply with the SCRA’s interest rate cap in three ways: (1) 
by failing to apply the benefit after receiving written notice 
and qualifying active duty military orders; (2) by “failing to 
make acceptable efforts to obtain qualifying active duty 
military documents from servicemembers who requested 
benefits, but did not provide qualifying military documents;” 
and (3) by “failing to notify servicemembers that they might 
be eligible for SCRA benefits when they provided their 
military documents to Defendants for purposes other than 
seeking the 6% interest rate.”234  Although the Department of 
Justice’s complaint alleges that the violations were 
intentional,235 the inclusion of allegations related to 
borrowers who expressly did not satisfy the statutory 
prerequisites for receiving the SCRA’s interest rate benefit 
reflects a continuation of the strict liability theory. 
C. Expansion of Liability Under the SCRA 
 In addition to adopting the strict liability theory, the 
agencies acted consistent with regulatory theorists’ 
expectations by expanding the reach of many provisions of the 
SCRA in a way that increased the financial recovery under 
these enforcement actions.  These expansive interpretations 
have been adopted both through public consent orders and 
through non-public guidance to independent consultants 
tasked with reviewing loan files under the settlements 
described above.236  Although non-public, many financial 
 
 233. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice 
Department Reaches $60 Million Settlement with Sallie Mae to Resolve 
Allegations of Charging Military Servicemembers Excessive Rates on Student 
Loans (May 13, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14-
ag-502.html; Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Announces 
Settlement with Sallie Mae for Unfair and Deceptive Practices and Violations of 
the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (May 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2014/pr14033.html. 
 234. Compl. ¶ 16, United States v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:99-mc-09999 (D. 
Del. May 13, 2014); Consent Order ¶ 2, Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:99-mc-09999 (D. 
Del. May 13, 2014). 
 235. Compl., supra note 234, ¶ 21. 
 236. See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text. 
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institutions are being held to these non-public standards even 
though they had not been made aware of them.  In the 
author’s experience while advising clients regarding SCRA 
matters, many financial institutions have indicated that the 
federal agencies are requiring institutions to adopt these non-
public—and, in some cases, not previously communicated—
rules going forward, and are imposing liability retroactively 
based on these non-public standards.  And because these 
standards are new, non-public, and inconsistent with the text 
of the SCRA itself, it is not surprising that creditors had not 
historically adopted these positions.  Nor is it surprising that 
the retroactive application of these standards would result in 
substantial monetary penalties.  This section will focus on 
two areas of such expansive non-public interpretations: 
interpretations regarding the SCRA’s default judgment 
protection, and regarding the SCRA’s interest rate cap 
protection. 
1. Expansion of the Scope of Default Judgment 
Protection 
 Among the ways the agencies have increased financial 
penalties under the SCRA is through the expansion of the 
scope of the SCRA’s default judgment protection.  This 
protection was a key component of the original SSCRA of 
1918,237 and as codified was indicative of the balance between 
servicemember and creditor the Act was designed to 
achieve.238  The 1918 version of the Act provided that if a 
defendant did not make an appearance in any action or 
proceeding commenced in any court, the plaintiff must file an 
affidavit before judgment is entered stating (1) that the 
defendant is in military service; (2) that the defendant is not 
in military service; or (3) that the plaintiff is unable to 
determine the defendant’s military status.239  If the plaintiff 
did not file such an affidavit, the court was prohibited from 
 
 237. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 65-103, § 200, 40 Stat. 
440, 441–42 (1918). 
 238. H.R. REP. NO. 181 (1917), reprinted in 55 CONG. REC. 7789 (1917) 
(touting the fact that the bill does not “cast a cloud on all default judgments” 
and that a defendant can reopen a judgment only if military service prejudiced 
the servicemember’s defense as evidence of “[t]he spirit of moderation which 
runs through the bill” and the bill’s “policy of moderation and flexibility.”). 
 239. Id. 
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entering a default judgment against the defendant unless the 
court appointed an attorney to represent the defendant.240  
The court could also require the plaintiff to post a bond to 
indemnify the defendant against loss as a condition to 
entering the default judgment, and take such other action as 
the court deemed appropriate.241  If a default judgment was 
entered against a defendant servicemember, and if the 
defendant was “prejudiced by reason of his military service in 
making a defense thereto,” the servicemember could within 
ninety days of leaving military service apply to the court to 
open the judgment—”provided . . . that the defendant has a 
meritorious or legal defense to the action or some part 
thereof.”242  Criminal penalties applied to anyone who 
knowingly filed a false affidavit.243  Although the language of 
the statute has been amended and updated over the nearly 
one hundred years since it was first enacted, the framework 
of this provision remains very similar to the 1918 version.244 
 a. The Affidavit Requirement.  While the framework 
remains largely the same, the current text contains a number 
of important changes from the 1918 SSCRA.  One important 
change made in the 2003 re-enactment is a clarification of 
which party has the obligation under the default judgment 
protection.  Prior to the enactment of the SCRA, the Act 
provided that “the plaintiff, before entering judgment shall 
file in the court an affidavit” indicating military status.245  
This language was confusing, in no small part because a 
plaintiff cannot enter judgment against a defendant.  The 
2003 SCRA clarified this provision to provide that “the court, 
before entering judgment for the plaintiff, shall require the 
plaintiff to file with the court an affidavit” indicating military 
status.246  The change is a small but significant one.  Rather 
than the SCRA placing the burden on the plaintiff to file the 
affidavit as did the SSCRA, the SCRA now places the burden 
 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act § 200(4). 
 243. Id. § 200(2). 
 244. Compare Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (2012), 
with Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 65-103, § 200, 40 Stat. 
440, 441–42 (1918). 
 245. 50 U.S.C. app. § 520(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 246. 50 U.S.C. app. § 521(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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on the court to require the affidavit.247  Many litigants—
including pro se plaintiffs, litigants in small claims court, and 
unsophisticated or inexperienced counsel—may be unfamiliar 
with the SCRA and its affidavit requirement.  It is therefore 
more appropriate to place the obligation on the court to 
require the affidavit, since courts may more reasonably be 
expected to have notice of this requirement.  The practical 
impact of this clarification is that a plaintiff cannot violate 
the SCRA by not filing an affidavit because the SCRA 
imposes requirements on courts, not plaintiffs.248 
 Notwithstanding this significant clarification in 
language, federal and state agencies have continued to 
enforce the SCRA’s affidavit requirement against plaintiffs—
and to impose substantial civil liability—as if the phrase, “the 
court . . . shall require” can be read to mean “the plaintiff . . . 
shall file.”249  And they have taken this view even in cases 
where the court itself did not require the plaintiff to file an 
affidavit prior to the court entering a default judgment.  For 
example, in guidance to the independent consultants (ICs) 
reviewing loan files as part of the Independent Foreclosure 
Review, the agencies instructed the ICs to find liability in any 
case where a mortgage servicer did not file an affidavit 
regardless of whether or not the court required an affidavit—
and even if the court discouraged affidavits.250  Thus, 
mortgage servicers seeking a default judgment in a court that 
did not require, or even discouraged, the filing of an affidavit 
were surprised to discover they were being held liable under 
the SCRA for complying with a court’s instructions.251  While 
 
 247. Pre-2003 cases placed the obligation on the plaintiff, consistent with the 
statutory text at the time.  See JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 69, § 3-4(a)(4), at 
3-14 (collecting cases). 
 248. Even if a court expressly required a plaintiff to file an affidavit (e.g., 
through local rule or standing order), a plaintiff’s failure to do so would at most 
be a violation of the court’s requirement and not of the SCRA. 
 249. E.g., Consent Judgment, supra note 40, Ex. A at 32–35, Ex. H at 1–11. 
 250. IC Guidance, supra note 181. 
 251. In the author’s representation of many financial institutions on SCRA 
issues, several of the foreclosure counsel retained by the institution reported 
that some courts affirmatively discouraged filing any documents other than 
those specified by the court for seeking a default judgment.  If an affidavit was 
not required by the court, foreclosure counsel followed the court’s instructions 
and did not file the affidavit.  The agencies have taken the position that this is 
not a defense to SCRA liability, notwithstanding the statute’s direction that 
“the court . . . shall require” the filing of the affidavit. 
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this result is starkly at odds with the text of the statute, it is 
consistent with the bureaucratic tendency to adopt aggressive 
enforcement positions and to maximize financial recoveries. 
 b.  Reliance on the DMDC.  Until recent years, a 
creditor seeking to determine whether a person was in 
military service was largely dependent on the servicemember, 
or someone familiar with the servicemember, informing the 
creditor of the servicemember’s military status.  
Alternatively, the creditor could request a certificate from the 
branch of the armed forces.252  While such certificates were 
and are considered prima facie evidence of military service,253 
a creditor who had no notice of a debtor’s military service, or 
in which branch the person might be serving, would not know 
to request a certificate or from which service branch.  And it 
seems highly unlikely that Congress intended every creditor 
to send letters to every branch of the armed forces any time 
the creditor intended to take action against a debtor—
particularly during times of armed conflict, when service 
branches would have much more important things to do than 
respond to millions of such certificate requests. 
 In 2002, the Department of Defense’s Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) established a website 
through which creditors and other interested parties with 
certain information could determine whether a person was on 
active duty.254  The results from the DMDC website searches 
were intended to be “certificates” under the Act.255  The 
DMDC website was not publically accessible until April 
2005—approximately sixteen months after the SCRA was 
enacted.256  Until April 2012, the information available on the 
 
 252. 50 U.S.C. app. § 581(1) (2000); 50 U.S.C. app. § 582(a)–(b) (2012). 
 253. 50 U.S.C. app. § 581(1) (2000); 50 U.S.C. app. § 582(a) (2012).  The 
certificate requirement was part of the original SSCRA of 1918.  The drafters 
explained that the certificate “is designed to remove difficulties that might occur 
in the manner of satisfying any court of the fact of service as a soldier or sailor 
and of establishing the fact of the death of any one in military service.  It does 
not make a hard and fast requirement that a certificate shall be furnished in all 
cases, but suggests that to be a most satisfactory method.  This statement in the 
certificate is subject to rebuttal.”  Ferry, Rosenbaum & Wigmore, supra note 78, 
at 214. 
 254. Aff. of Kris L. Hoffman 1, Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., No. 
1:08-cv-00361 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Hoffman Affidavit]. 
 255. Id. at 2 (attesting that an inquiry will result in a “certificate” bearing 
the facsimile signature of the Director of the DMDC). 
 256. Id. at 1. 
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DMDC website was limited: it would provide only (1) the 
name of the person as submitted by the requestor; (2) the 
date the person first entered military service (but not the date 
the person entered the most recent period of military service 
or information about any intervening periods when a person 
was not on active duty); (3) whether the individual is on 
active duty on the date the search is performed; (4) the 
individual’s active duty end date (if the person was in 
military service within the previous 367 days and is no longer 
on active duty); and (5) the military branch in which the 
individual served or is serving.257  Thus, the DMDC did not 
provide all of the information a creditor would need to 
determine SCRA eligibility, such as active duty status at time 
of loan origination.  And the DMDC website permitted only 
single searches; it did not provide multiple-search (i.e., batch 
search) capability.  In April 2012, after many of the DOJ’s 
and federal banking agencies’ enforcement actions had either 
settled or had been initiated, the DMDC modified the website 
to allow for batch searching; to allow for searches of historical 
“as of” dates; and to provide the date a reservist received 
orders to report for active duty.258 
 Unfortunately, even after the DMDC was updated to 
provide more of the information creditors need to determine 
SCRA eligibility, the DMDC website has suffered from 
chronic accuracy problems.259  The DMDC itself has 
acknowledged accuracy problems, which it characterizes as a 
 
 257. Id. at 2.  In the experience of the author, having run dozens of DMDC 
searches, the beginning dates returned during this period reflected the date the 
individual first entered military service.  For example, a person who entered 
military service five years ago and served for one year, left military service for 
three years, and then resumed military service would have a beginning date in 
the DMDC of five years ago. 
 258. Def. Manpower Data Ctr., SCRA-News: Announcing SCRA 2.0, 
SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT, SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT 
(SCRA) WEBSITE (Apr. 10, 2012), 
http://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/scra/news.xhtml; see also GAO MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURES, supra note 22, at 19 (noting that prior to April 2012, only single 
searches were available); GAO SCRA REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that 
the April 2012 upgrade to the DMDC permitted batch file searches).  
Additionally, in the author’s experience, the beginning dates were changed to 
reflect the beginning date of the servicemember’s most recent period of military 
service. 
 259. E.g., GAO MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES, supra note 22, at 19 (discussing 
reports of accuracy problems). 
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“small error rate.”260  Nevertheless, the DMDC cautions users 
of its website from relying on the website if there are any 
other indicia of a servicemember’s military service, stating 
that even if the DMDC website indicates a person is not on 
active duty, a person may be liable under the “punitive 
provisions of the SCRA.”261  The DMDC has also noted that it 
previously had only captured active duty periods of thirty 
days or more,262 even though servicemembers on active duty 
may still be SCRA eligible during those shorter periods of 
service, and that its use of “active duty” is more limited than 
the SCRA’s use of that term.263  Additionally, creditors have 
observed significant lag times between a person entering 
military service and the information appearing on the DMDC 
website.264  These accuracy and latency issues can cause 
substantial problems for creditors relying on the website, 
which many are required to do under various settlement 
 
 260. E.g., Def. Manpower Data Ctr., Servicemembers Civil Relief Act Website 
v. 2.9 Users Guide, SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT (SCRA) WEBSITE 3 
(2012).  In the author’s experience working with clients, this error rate has been 
as high as fifteen percent. 
 261. Id. at 3, 6.  At least one court has held that reliance on the DMDC 
search results in executing an affidavit indicating whether a defendant was in 
military service is insufficient when other documents (in this case, a bankruptcy 
petition) show military service.  In re Templehoff, 339 B.R. 49, 51–54 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 262. Def. Manpower Data Ctr., supra note 260, at 14 (“Prior to 2007, DMDC 
only received information on active duty periods of more than 30 consecutive 
days.”). 
 263. Id. (“Coverage under the SCRA is broader in some cases and includes 
some categories of persons on active duty for purposes of the SCRA who would 
not be reported as on Active Duty in this file.”). 
 264. During the Independent Foreclosure Review (IFR), see supra notes 212–
17 and accompanying text, independent consultants and mortgage servicers 
reported lags in the updating of the DMDC website.  They identified cases 
where the mortgage servicer had relied on DMDC search results indicating a 
person was not in military service, but later DMDC website searches indicated 
the person had been on active duty at the time of foreclosure.  IC Guidance, 
supra note 181.  In the author’s experience in working with many clients on 
DMDC search issues, the author has heard of latency periods as large as thirty 
days.  The DMDC reports, however, that its database is updated daily and that 
most service branches submit data to it daily.  Letter from Col. Paul E. 
Kantwill, Dir., Office of Legal Policy, Dep’t of Def., to Mr. John H. Dalton, 
President, Hous. Policy Council, Fin. Servs. Roundtable 3 (Jan. 3, 2013) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Kantwill Letter] (“DMDC updates all data within 24 
hours of receipt from the Service Components, and most of the components 
submit data daily to DMDC.”). 
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agreements with federal regulators,265 since the creditor may 
take action in reliance on the DMDC’s representation—and 
without any information to suggest that the DMDC’s 
representation is inaccurate—only to learn after the fact that 
the debtor was in military service and that the creditor may 
be subject to strict liability.266  The DMDC has stated that it 
continues to work on improving the accuracy of the website.267  
But that may be cold comfort to those who have been 
subjected to civil liability for relying on the DMDC website’s 
results. 
 Although the DMDC certificates are by statute 
deemed prima facie evidence of the individual’s military 
service or lack thereof, the federal agencies have imposed 
liability on mortgage servicers in cases where the servicer 
relied on a DMDC website result and otherwise had no 
knowledge of the borrower’s military service.268  Creditors 
who relied on a certificate from the DMDC indicating that a 
borrower was not in military service, and who otherwise had 
no knowledge of the servicemember’s military service, were 
not simply required to return the servicemember to the status 
quo ex ante, but were also required to pay substantial civil 
penalties.269  The agencies’ imposition of liability in such 
cases—where a creditor relied on a certificate issued by the 
Department of Defense’s DMDC database—is unjustifiable 
under the SCRA, but is consistent with bureaucratic 
incentives to maximize recoveries. 
 
 265. E.g., Consent Order, supra note 220, ¶ 4. 
 266. Even consultants working with the government have experienced these 
accuracy issues with the DMDC website.  During the IFR, ICs were instructed 
to re-run their batch testing of in-scope borrower populations because of 
concerns that previous search results were inaccurate.  IC Guidance, supra note 
181. 
 267. Kantwill Letter, supra note 264, at 1 (“DMDC has, and will continue to, 
work with its Service Components to identify known areas of data accuracy and 
timeliness concerns.  While recognizing that no system is perfect, we are 
committed to continuously improving the quality, reliability, and efficacy of 
available information.”). 
 268. E.g., IC Guidance, supra note 181 (stating that the SCRA’s foreclosure 
protection provision is a strict liability statute and that “there is no safe harbor 
for servicers who conducted a DMDC query that did not accurately report the 
Early Alert status.”). 
 269. Id. at 2–3.  The agencies indicated, however, that they might consider a 
reduced civil penalty in a case where an affidavit was based on a DMDC result 
which later turned out to be inaccurate.  Id. 
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 c.  Servicemembers with Notice of the Proceedings.  
Prior to the 2003 reenactment of the SCRA, there was 
confusion about the interaction between the SCRA’s default 
judgment protection and the SCRA’s provision allowing a 
servicemember to seek a stay of civil proceedings when 
military service materially affected the servicemember’s 
ability to participate in the proceeding.270  The principal 
difference between the default judgment and stay protections 
is that the default judgment protection permits 
servicemembers to seek vacation of a default judgment in 
certain circumstances.271  Some had argued that the two 
provisions were designed for mutually exclusive situations: 
the default judgment provision for when a servicemember 
does not have notice of a proceeding, and the stay provision 
for when the servicemember does.272  Yet others argued that 
the default judgment and stay protections are two items on 
the menu of options from which servicemembers may 
choose.273 
 In 1990, an effort was made to resolve this tension by 
providing that an application for a stay—and thus notice of 
the action—would not preclude the operation of the default 
judgment protection.274  A proposal was made to amend the 
default judgment provision to provide: “An application for a 
stay pursuant to section 201 of this Act shall not be an 
appearance that would preclude a service member from 
reopening a default judgment.”275  This proposal was 
eventually withdrawn.276 
 In 2003, Congress took a different direction.  In 
reporting the bill that eventually became the SCRA, the 
 
 270. 50 U.S.C. app. § 522 (2000). 
 271. Id. § 521(g). 
 272. McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 678, 687 (“It is 
inappropriate and inconsistent with case law to allow a servicemember two 
forms of relief, when each was initially adopted to protect servicemembers in 
mutually exclusive circumstances.”). 
 273. JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 69, § 3-6, at 3-36 (“[W]hen a 
servicemember has notice of a proceeding, that servicemember will have to 
decide whether to enter an appearance, attempt to be released from duty to 
defend, and to defend or whether to await a default judgment and attempt to 
reopen it at a more convenient time.”). 
 274. Huckabee, supra note 112, at 161. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 163, 172 (“The amendments were eventually deleted due to 
political compromise.”). 
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House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs explained that the 
SCRA was intended to clarify that the default judgment and 
stay provisions apply in mutually exclusive circumstances.  
The report stated that the “protections against default 
judgments would clarify that the protections under this 
section are intended to apply when a servicemember does not 
receive notice of an action or proceeding.”277  To effect this 
clarification, the default judgment provision was amended to 
provide that “[i]f a servicemember who is a defendant in an 
action covered by this section receives actual notice of the 
action, the servicemember may request a stay of 
proceeding . . . .”278  The 2003 SCRA also clarified that the 
stay of proceedings protection applied to cases where the 
servicemember has notice of a proceeding.279  For example, 
the stay of proceedings section was given the heading “Stay of 
proceedings when servicemember has notice.”280  The first 
subsection of the provision also clarifies that the stay of 
proceedings applies to any civil action or proceeding when the 
servicemember “has received notice of the action or 
proceeding.”281 
 Notwithstanding these clarifications, the agencies 
have imposed civil penalties on mortgage servicers when the 
servicemember had actual knowledge of the foreclosure 
proceeding yet took no apparent effort to seek a stay or 
otherwise participate in the proceeding.  In guidance to the 
independent consultants conducting the file reviews required 
by many of the settlements, the agencies do not make any 
provision for viewing cases differently where a borrower 
clearly had notice of a proceeding than cases where there may 
be no evidence of borrower notice.282  Creditors were surprised 
to learn that some servicemembers would receive six-figure 
checks as compensation for foreclosures when the 
servicemember had notice of the foreclosure proceeding but 
 
 277. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 37 (2003); see also id. at 45 (distinguishing 
between the procedures for the default judgment protection and those for a 
request for a stay “when the service member has notice of a hearing.”). 
 278. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 521(f) (2003). 
 279. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 45–46 (explaining that the provision regarding 
stay of proceedings “when the servicemember defendant has notice” was 
amended for clarity). 
 280. 50 U.S.C. app. § 522. 
 281. Id. § 522(a)(2). 
 282. IC Guidance, supra note 181, at 14. 
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took no effort to stay or otherwise participate in the 
proceeding.283  Such windfalls for servicer inaction are 
fundamentally inconsistent with the balancing of 
servicemember and creditor interests built into the Act, but 
are consistent with the bureaucratic tendency toward large 
financial recoveries. 
2. Expansion of the Interest Rate Protection 
 The predicted bureaucratic proclivities have been 
further manifest by the agencies’ expansion of liability under 
the SCRA’s interest rate protection.  The interest rate cap is 
one of the most frequently used SCRA financial protections.284  
One of the central additions of the 1942 amendments, the 
interest rate protection caps at six percent the interest a 
servicemember can incur on credit obligations, originated 
prior to the servicemember’s period of military service.285  The 
act requires that a creditor forgive any interest above six 
percent and reduce the periodic payment in accordance with 
the reduction in interest.286  The servicemember is required to 
provide the creditor with “written notice and a copy of the 
military orders calling the servicemember to military service” 
to qualify for the benefit, and may do so up to 180 days after 
leaving military service.287  Once the servicemember qualifies 
for the benefit, the creditor must apply the benefit effective as 
of the date of military service—which often will result in a 
retroactive application of the benefit.288  Consistent with the 
SCRA’s balancing of servicemember and commercial 
interests, a court may grant a creditor relief from this 
protection if it appears that the servicemember’s ability to 
pay the contract rate of interest is not materially affected by 
the servicemember’s military service.289 
 
 283. This conduct by some servicemembers was inconsistent with guidance 
that some commentators have been providing to servicemembers for decades.  
See, e.g., Garth K. Chandler, The Impact of a Request for a Stay of Proceedings 
Under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 102 MIL. L. REV. 169, 178–79 
(1983). 
 284. Meixell, supra note 137, at 2. 
 285. 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(a)(1). 
 286. Id. § 527(a)(2)–(3). 
 287. Id. § 527(b)(1). 
 288. Id. § 527(b)(2). 
 289. Id. § 527(c).  Some have argued that the burden of proving no material 
effect rests on the creditor.  See, e.g., JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 114, § 3-12, 
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 The widespread use of the interest rate cap in the 
early 1990s during the Persian Gulf War drew renewed 
attention to this provision and highlighted some of its 
shortcomings.  Financial services products had evolved 
substantially since 1942, and the application of the then-50-
year-old law to the modern consumer credit marketplace 
created unforeseen challenges.290  Additionally, the Act was 
silent regarding how the interest rate protection should be 
implemented, leaving servicemembers and creditors 
guessing.291 
 In 1990, the House and Senate Committees on 
Veterans’ Affairs held joint hearings on the SCRA’s interest 
rate protection.  During these hearings, several witnesses 
testified that creditors were asking servicemembers to 
provide the creditor with a written request and copy of the 
orders calling the servicemember to military service so that 
the creditor could confirm military service, know the effective 
date of the benefit, and identify which obligations might be 
eligible for the benefit.292  For example, the CEO of Navy 
Federal Credit Union testified: 
We are requiring only a statement in writing, in no 
particular format, from our members advising us that they 
 
at 3-34.  However, this is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction 
that the burden of proof be determined on a case-by-case basis.  Boone v. 
Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 569 (1943); see also supra notes 165–69. 
 290. See, e.g., James Pottorff, A Look at the Credit Industry’s Approach to the 
Six Percent Limit on Interest Rates, 1990 ARMY LAW. 49, 50 (1990) (“The first-
time application of this law to a computerized credit industry has resulted in 
numerous unanticipated problems for creditors and debtors alike.”); id. at 52 
(“Even for creditors who correctly apply section 526, compliance is sometimes 
technically difficult.”); see also supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
 291. See, e.g., McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 680. 
 292. See, e.g., Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act and Veterans’ 
Reemployment Rights: Joint Hearing Before the Comms. on Veterans’ Affairs of 
the H.R. and U.S. Sen., supra note 129, at 48–49 (statement of Robert J. 
Engelstad, Senior Vice President, Mortg. and Lender Standards, Fed. Nat’l 
Mortg. Ass’n) (stating that FNMA (Fannie Mae) required servicemembers to 
provide notice and a copy of the call-up orders) [hereinafter Engelstad 
Statement]; Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act and Veterans’ Reemployment 
Rights: Joint Hearing Before the Comms. on Veterans’ Affairs of the H.R. and 
U.S. Sen., supra note 129, at 186 (statement of Thomas J. Hughes, President 
and Chief Exec. Officer, Navy Fed. Credit Union) (same) [hereinafter Hughes 
Statement]; see also Pottorff, supra note 290, at 50 (“As a general rule, these 
organizations [the GSEs] require that mortgage issuers obtain a copy of a 
reserve component service member’s orders to active duty before granting the 
reduction in interest.”). 
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are being called to active duty and requesting relief under 
the Act for whichever of the many types of credit they may 
have with Navy Federal.  A copy of the call-up orders is 
sufficient confirmation.293 
 Testimony was also taken regarding whether the 
interest rate protection should be self-effecting, or whether 
servicemembers should be required to take steps to initiate 
the protection.  Some argued that it should be viewed as self-
effecting.294  Most witnesses testified, however, that orders 
were necessary to assist creditors in properly applying the 
protection.295  And at that time the Judge Advocate General’s 
Office provided guidance that servicemembers were required 
to inform creditors of their military service and to provide a 
request for the SCRA interest rate cap and a copy of military 
orders.296  When the SCRA was enacted in 2003, the Act 
included the requirement that a servicemember provide 
“written notice and a copy of the military orders calling the 
servicemember to military service” to qualify for the 
benefit.297  The House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 
explained that this requirement “codif[ied] practices 
established during the Persian Gulf War” and that it believed 
the “burden should be on the servicemember to initiate the 
protection.”298 
 Although the statutory text and guidance from 
legislative history are consistent and quite clear regarding 
what the SCRA requires a servicemember to provide to 
qualify for the interest rate protection, the agencies’ 
aggressive interpretations of this requirement have imposed 
 
 293. Hughes Statement, supra note 292, at 186. 
 294. See, e.g., Memorandum from Henry B. Shepard, Jr., Lynne B. Barr, 
Gordon H. Piper & Bradford J. Smith, Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Federal Laws 
Protecting Persons in Military Service, (Aug. 27, 1990), reprinted in Soldiers’ 
and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act and Veterans’ Reemployment Rights: Joint Hearing 
Before the Comms. on Veterans’ Affairs of the H.R. and U.S. Sen., supra note 
129, at 156. 
 295. See, e.g., Hughes Statement, supra note 292, at 186 (“There can be 
nothing automatic, since the financial institution needs to know what 
individuals and which of their obligations are affected.”). 
 296. McDonough, Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 682 (citing Gregory 
M. Huckabee, Legal Assistance for Those Who Go in Harm’s Way, 71 MIL. REV. 
33 (1991); Dale Ellis, Give Credit Where Credit is Due, 8 COMPLEAT LAW. 19, 21 
(1991)). 
 297. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(b)(1) (2003). 
 298. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 39 (2003). 
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liability for practices that not only comply with the plain 
language of the SCRA, but also complied with guidance from 
other regulatory agencies.  Four areas of expansion in 
particular demonstrate the agencies’ expansion of liability 
under the SCRA: (1) what qualifies as “written notice;” (2) 
what qualifies as a copy of “military orders calling the 
servicemember to military service;” (3) what constitutes 
“interest” under the SCRA; and (4) what happens when a 
servicemember fails to satisfy the statutory prerequisites. 
 a. What is “written notice”?  One significant area of 
expansion in the agencies’ recent SCRA enforcement efforts is 
what constitutes “written notice.”  Many in the industry, and 
indeed most administrative agencies, had interpreted “notice” 
as synonymous with “request.”  But the DOJ and federal 
banking agencies departed from this interpretation, instead 
taking the position in their recent enforcement actions that 
virtually any communication informing a creditor that a 
servicemember is in military service constitutes the required 
“notice.”  As a result, the agencies have since imposed liability 
in thousands of cases where borrowers had not requested 
SCRA interest rate protections.299 
 Prior to the recent enforcement actions, the consensus 
view was that “notice” meant “request.”  During the 1990 
hearings, some witnesses characterized the requirement for 
“notice” as requiring “notice” of qualification for the interest 
rate benefit.300  The American Forces Information Service—a 
division of the Department of Defense—emphasized that “the 
interest rate reduction doesn’t occur automatically—service 
members must request it.”301  Most government agencies have 
 
 299. See, e.g., Consent Order at 5, Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:99-mc-09999 (D. 
Del. May 13, 2014) (clarifying that nearly half of the settlement fund 
established by the consent order is attributable to borrowers who had not 
requested SCRA interest rate benefits). 
 300. See, e.g., Engelstad Statement, supra note 292, at 138 (discussing 
“notice” of eligibility requirements). 
 301. AM. FORCES INFO. SERV., SOLDIERS’ AND SAILORS’ CIVIL RELIEF ACT 
PROVIDES UMBRELLA OF PROTECTION 2 (2002), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/specials/Relief_Act_Revision/index.html; The 
Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 
Hearings on H.R. 5111 and H.R. 4017 Before the Subcomm. on Benefits of the H. 
Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (2002) (emphasis added).  
The American Forces Information Service was disestablished in 2008, at which 
time Department of Defense formed the Defense Media Activity.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., DIR. 5105.74 (Dec. 18, 2007). 
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similarly interpreted “notice” as synonymous with “request.”  
For example, the Department of Education’s regulations 
provide that a servicemember with student loans must 
provide a written “request” and copy of orders to be eligible 
for the interest rate benefit,302 and has explained that it views 
“notice” and “request” as “substantively the same.”303  In a 
2012 settlement, the DOJ also equated written notice to a 
creditor’s receipt of a written “request” for SCRA benefits,304 
although, as discussed below, the DOJ subsequently departed 
from this position.  Similarly, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s website instructs servicemembers that to 
obtain the SCRA’s interest rate benefit “[y]ou will need to 
send a written request to your servicer, and will also need to 
provide your servicer with a copy of your orders calling you on 
to active duty.”305  The Judge Advocate General’s School also 
interpreted “notice” to mean “request,”306 and included in its 
SCRA Guide a “Sample Letter to Creditor Requesting 
Reduction to 6% Interest.”307  And the OCC, in its 
Comptroller’s Handbook that predates its enforcement actions 
against financial institutions and that as of this writing is 
still in circulation, explained that a creditor must reduce the 
interest rate to six percent “[u]pon receiving a written request 
for relief and a copy of the service member’s military 
 
 302. 34 C.F.R. § 682.202(a)(4), (a)(8) (2013). 
 303. Letter from Pamela Moran, Dep’t of Educ., to the Consumer Bankers 
Assoc., Educ. Fin. Council, Nat’l Council of Higher Educ. Loan Programs & the 
Student Loan Servicing Alliance 1 (undated) (on file with author).  In response 
to a request that SCRA interest rate benefits be provided solely on basis of 
receipt of military orders, the Department of Education stated, “[T]his 
suggestion is not consistent with the SCRA.  It also is not consistent with the 
Department’s regulations in this area because it eliminates the servicemember’s 
request.”  Id. 
 304. Consent Order at 6, 8, Capital One, N.A., No. 1:12-cv-00828 (E.D. Va. 
July 26, 2012). 
 305. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, How can I Reduce my Student 
Loan Interest Rate under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)?, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1501/how-can-i-reduce-my-student-
loan-interest-rate-under-servicemembers-civil-relief-act-scra.html (updated 
June 17, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 306. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, U.S. 
ARMY, COMMANDER’S LEGAL HANDBOOK, at 247 (2013) (explaining that to 
qualify for the interest rate protection “[s]ervice member must request and 
provide copy of orders.”). 
 307. JAG SCRA GUIDE, supra note 69, app. B, at B-1. 
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orders.”308  As discussed below, though, the agencies have 
since changed this position in its enforcement actions 
(although it has not taken this previous guidance out of 
circulation). 
 These consistent interpretations of “notice” as 
synonymous with “request” made it even more surprising 
when the federal agencies provided guidance to independent 
consultants conducting file reviews required by various 
settlements that “notice” need not be a request, but could be 
any form of notice of military service to the creditor.309  In 
other words, “notice” no longer meant notice of the intent to 
claim SCRA benefits, but merely notice of military service.  
This guidance appeared to ignore the many other reasons a 
servicemember may submit military orders to a creditor, such 
as to request a military deferment310 or to demonstrate 
hardship in connection with a short sale request.311  The 
retroactive application of this new standard had resulted in a 
substantial expansion of liability for financial institutions 
that had provided servicemember with a deferment, short 
sale, or other assistance requested by the servicemember, but 
not with SCRA interest rate benefits that were not requested 
by the borrower.312  And even more surprisingly, the agencies 
imposed liability in cases where the notice was provided 
orally rather than in writing.313  This expansion of the 
 
 308. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S 
HANDBOOK: SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT OF 2003 2 (2011) (emphasis 
added). 
 309. See, e.g., IC Guidance, supra note 181.  This guidance was inconsistent 
with the OCC’s own previous guidance.  See supra note 294. 
 310. E.g., FED. STUDENT AID, OFFICE OF THE DEP’T OF EDUC., Deferment and 
Forbearance, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/deferment-forbearance (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2014). 
 311. E.g., FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, Fact Sheet: FHFA Short Sale Assistance 
for Military Home Owners with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Loans 
[hereinafter FHFA Fact Sheet],  
http://www.militaryfamily.org/assets/pdf/MilitaryShortSaleAssistanceFactSheet
F.PDF (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (requiring copies of military orders for 
servicemember to qualify for short sale); see also FANNIE MAE, Servicing Guide 
Announcement SVC-2012-19, (Aug. 12, 2012), 
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/svc1219.pdf (same). 
 312. The DOJ established a penalty formula for alleged interest rate 
violations of a refund of the difference between the rate charged and six percent, 
plus the greater of three times that amount or $500.  Consent Order at 29–30, 
Capital One, N.A., No. 1:12-cv-00828 (E.D. Va. July 26, 2012). 
 313. See, e.g., IC Guidance, supra note 181. 
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statutory requirement that the servicemember provide 
“written notice” to include oral requests is impossible to 
reconcile with the statute.  But it is consistent with 
regulatory theory’s predictions. 
 b. What is a “military order calling the servicemember 
to military service”?  Another area where the agencies have 
expanded creditor liability is by expanding the meaning of 
“military orders calling the servicemember to military 
service.”314  “Military service” is a defined term under the 
SCRA, and for members of the U.S. armed forces generally 
means “active duty.”315  Thus, orders calling a servicemember 
“to military service” can only mean those orders calling the 
servicemember to “active duty” (i.e., ordering the 
servicemember to leave a non-active duty status and enter 
active duty).316  As discussed above, this requirement was 
added to the statute to allow creditors to know the time 
period during which to apply the interest rate cap, since the 
cap often must be applied retroactively.317  Only the orders 
calling the servicemember to active duty provide this critical 
information to the creditor. 
 Here again, the agencies have departed from the plain 
meaning of the statute in imposing substantial liability.  
Servicemembers receive myriad different orders during their 
military service.  These include permanent change of station 
(PCS) orders, temporary change of station (TCS) orders, 
temporary duty (TDY) orders, as well as many others.318  
While these orders are certainly “military orders” requiring a 
servicemember to take certain action, these are not the orders 
 
 314. See Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(b)(1) (2012). 
 315. Id. § 511(2)(A)(i). 
 316. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, How can I Reduce my 
Student Loan Interest Rate under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA)?, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1501/how-can-i-reduce-my-student-
loan-interest-rate-under-servicemembers-civil-relief-act-scra.html (updated 
June 17, 2013) (“You will need to send a written request to your servicer, and 
will also need to provide your servicer with a copy of your orders calling you on 
to active duty.”). 
 317. See supra notes 190–98 and accompanying text; see also McDonough, 
Huckabee & Gentile, supra note 109, at 688 (“The orders also indicate the 
period of time for which the servicemember is ordered to duty . . . . [and] 
provide[] guidance to the creditor on when and how long the interest protection 
should be applied.”). 
 318. E.g., Army Reg. 600-8-105, Military Orders, available at 
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r600_8_105.pdf. 
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that call the servicemember to military service; rather, they 
are orders instructing a servicemember already in military 
service to take specified action.  Yet federal agencies 
providing guidance in connection with the file reviews 
required by the various SCRA settlements have concluded 
that these orders and many others which do not call the 
servicemember to military service are qualifying orders for 
SCRA purposes.319  And in the DOJ’s settlement with Sallie 
Mae, the DOJ appears to signal that a qualifying military 
“order” includes any document  prepared by a branch of the 
armed forces, the Department of Defense, or a borrower’s 
commanding officer indicating active duty military service—
even if the document is not an “order” under any accepted 
meaning of that term.320  And because many creditors had not 
provided benefits where servicemembers had not provided 
qualifying military orders, the agencies have imposed 
substantial civil liability on that basis.321 
 The drafters of the SCRA understood that there is a 
difference between military orders and PCS orders.  This is 
evidenced by the specific inclusion of PCS orders in the 
SCRA’s lease protection.322  There, Congress expressly allows 
PCS orders to fulfill the eligibility requirements to terminate 
a lease of premises or an automobile.323  It is a longstanding 
rule of statutory interpretation that “[w]here Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”324  It follows that the 
drafters’ omission of PCS orders in Section 527 should be seen 
as intentional—and that PCS orders, like other orders that do 
not call the servicemember to military service, should not be 
 
 319. See, e.g., IC Guidance, supra note 181. 
 320. Consent Order at 17, Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:99-mc-09999, (D. Del. May 
13, 2014) (explaining that qualifying military orders include documents such 
DD-214 forms and letters from a borrower’s commanding officer to the creditor). 
 321. See, e.g., Kirk D. Jensen, John C. Redding & Sasha Leonhardt, Highway 
to the Danger Zone: Automotive Lending and the Servicemembers Civil Relief 
Act, 131 BANKING L.J. 126, 137 (2014); Kirk D. Jensen & Sasha Leonhardt, 
Students, Loan Servicers, and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 19 WESTLAW 
J. BANK & LENDER LIABILITY 1, 3 (Oct. 7, 2013). 
 322. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 535 (2012). 
 323. Id. 
 324. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). 
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considered “military orders” under the interest rate 
protection.325  But again, while the agencies’ position is 
inconsistent with the Act, it is consistent with bureaucratic 
tendencies. 
 c. What is “interest”?  Yet another aggressive agency 
interpretation resulting in increased creditor liability is in an 
unprecedented expansion of the meaning of “interest.”  The 
statute includes a broad but non-illustrative definition of the 
term “interest”: interest includes “service charges, renewal 
charges, fees, or any other charges (except bona fide 
insurance) with respect to an obligation or liability.”326  While 
the plain language of the definition of “interest” is undeniably 
broad, the language must be interpreted consistent with the 
ordinary meaning of the words used.327 
 For centuries, the term “interest” has been used to 
refer to the creditor’s compensation for the borrower’s use of 
the money borrowed.  In the eighteenth century, William 
Blackstone wrote that “when money is lent on a contract to 
receive not only the principal sum again, but also an increase 
by way of compensation for the use; which generally is called 
interest . . . .”328  Thus, “interest” was the compensation to the 
creditor for the borrower’s use of the borrowed funds.  This 
understanding of the meaning of “interest” as referring to 
compensation to the creditor continued into the nineteenth 
century.  For example, a law dictionary from the 1850s 
defined interest as “[t]he compensation which is paid to the 
lender or by the debtor to the creditor for . . . use [of 
money].”329  A few decades later, the Supreme Court similarly 
explained that “[i]nterest is the compensation allowed by law, 
or fixed by the parties, for the use or forbearance of money or 
 
 325. In 2011, the Department of Defense worked with a financial services 
trade association to develop an alternative form servicemembers can submit to 
request the SCRA benefit that is easier to interpret than military orders.  See 
GAO MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES, supra note 22, at 20.  But while this form may 
be easier to understand and interpret than a military order, it is not an “order 
calling the servicemember to military service” as required by the statute.  Id. 
 326. 50 U.S.C. app. § 527(d)(1). 
 327. E.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, LLC, 557 U.S. 519, 539 (2009) 
(“[T]he ordinary meaning of the words chosen by Congress provides the starting 
point for interpreting the statute.”). 
 328. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 454 (1915) 
(emphasis added). 
 329. J. Bouvier, A LAW DICTIONARY 652 (6th ed. 1856) (quoted in Smiley v. 
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 745 (1996) (emphasis added)). 
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as damages for its detention.”330 
 This understanding of the meaning of “interest” has 
continued into the present day.  Indeed, in 1996 the Supreme 
Court in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. relied on 
long-standing precedent and definitions in concluding that 
“interest” included compensation to the creditor in addition to 
the rate.331  And more recently, Black’s Law Dictionary has 
defined “interest” as “the compensation fixed by agreement or 
allowed by law for the use or detention of money, or for the 
loss of money by one who is entitled to its use.”332 
 When Congress used the term “interest” in the SCRA 
and in the SSCRA, it must be presumed that it did so in the 
context of this centuries-old understanding of the meaning of 
the term.333  Accordingly, “interest” in the SCRA should be 
interpreted consistent with its well-established historical 
meaning, which includes “service charges, renewal charges, 
fees, or any other charges” retained by the creditor, but does 
not include fees or charges, such as those paid to third 
parties, that do not compensate the creditor. 
 In the SCRA enforcement actions, however, the federal 
agencies have taken a more expansive view of the meaning of 
“interest” under the Act.  They have concluded that any fee or 
 
 330. Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. 177, 185 (1873) (emphasis added). 
 331. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 745–46. 
 332. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 2009). 
 333. The historical meaning of “interest” has consistently been applied in 
other federal and state laws that address interest and similar concepts.  For 
example, the National Bank Act—enacted prior to the 1942 enactment of the 
definition of interest in the SSCRA—empowers national banks to charge 
“interest” on obligations.  12 U.S.C. § 85 (2012).  The OCC has defined the 
meaning of “interest” in its regulations: “The term ‘interest’ as used in 12 U.S.C. 
§ 85 includes any payment compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for an 
extension of credit . . . .”  12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a) (2014) (emphasis added).  State 
law also generally follows the historical understanding of the term “interest.”  
For example, California law defines interest as “any fee, bonus, commission, 
discount or other compensation” received from a borrower.  CAL. CONST. art. XV, 
§ 1(2) (2014) (emphasis added).  Similarly, New York law excludes from the 
definition of “interest” reasonable fees, charges and costs for “services actually 
and necessarily rendered,” including costs for appraisals, title examinations, 
legal services, and inspections.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. III, § 4.3(b) 
(2014).  Texas law also defines “interest” as “compensation for the use, 
forbearance, or detention of money.”  TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.002(a)(4) 
(2013) (emphasis added).  When Congress used the term “interest” in the SCRA, 
it did so in the context of the numerous federal and state laws that consistently 
define “interest” as including various charges that compensate creditors for the 
extension of credit but excluding charges that are not retained by the creditor. 
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charge related to the underlying credit obligation is part of 
“interest” for SCRA purposes, specifically including inspection 
fees, Broker Price Opinion (BPO) fees, legal fees, and 
foreclosure-related charges—fees that generally are not 
retained by and therefore do not “compensate” the creditor.334  
Under this analysis, the only fees excluded are those for a 
separate product or service the consumer purchased 
independently, such as debt protection or credit monitoring.335  
This expansive interpretation of “interest” leads to the 
unprecedented result that charges for services such as 
property preservation (e.g., charges for lawn mowing, 
winterizing a home, and performing other assorted repairs) 
are for the first time under any federal or state law 
considered part of “interest.”  The result of this expansive 
interpretation is that alleged “violations” of the law have been 
found in many cases where charges were imposed that were 
not retained by the creditor, did not compensate the creditor, 
and would not be considered “interest” in any other context.  
While this expansion of liability is inconsistent with the 
structure and text of the statute, it is consistent with the 
bureaucratic tendencies observed by regulatory theorists. 
 d. What happens when a servicemember fails to satisfy 
the statutory prerequisites?  Historically, the financial services 
industry interpreted the requirements of “written notice” and 
“a copy of military orders calling the servicemember to 
military service” as being statutory prerequisites that a 
servicemember must satisfy to qualify for the SCRA’s interest 
rate benefit.  Just as taxpayers must satisfy specific 
requirements to receive tax refunds, the industry believed 
servicemembers must satisfy the SCRA’s requirements to 
qualify for SCRA benefits. 
 This view was supported by the SCRA requiring that 
the Department of Defense educate servicemembers 
regarding SCRA benefits.  Section 515 of the SCRA orders the 
Secretary of each branch of the military to “ensure that notice 
of the benefits accorded by this Act is provided in writing to 
persons in military service and to persons entering military 
service.”336  Consistent with this provision, creditors have 
 
 334. IC Guidance, supra note 181. 
 335. Id. 
 336. 50 U.S.C. app. § 515 (2000). 
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previously assumed that the responsibility of educating 
servicemembers about SCRA benefits rested on the 
Department of Defense rather than on creditors.  This view 
was reinforced by the legislative history to the SCRA, which 
clarified that the burden of satisfying the statutory 
prerequisites was intentionally placed on the 
servicemember.337 
 In recent SCRA enforcement activity, the agencies 
have signaled that they now expect creditors to shoulder 
much of the burden of educating servicemembers regarding 
SCRA benefits.  Specifically, the Sallie Mae Complaint 
indicates that the agencies believe a creditor violates the 
SCRA if the creditor “fail[s] to make acceptable efforts” to 
elicit qualifying documents from servicemembers who have 
not otherwise provided them, or if the creditor “fail[s] to 
notify servicemembers that they may be eligible for SCRA 
benefits” when they provide military documents for reasons 
unrelated to SCRA benefits.338  And because more than half of 
the Sallie Mae settlement fund is allocated toward borrowers 
who did not provide a written request and copy of active duty 
orders,339 it appears that this interpretation will be enforced 
retroactively.  While this shifting of the burden of educating 
servicemembers onto creditors and away from the 
Department of Defense is inconsistent with the statutory text 
and history, it is consistent with the predictions of regulatory 
theory. 
D. Expansion of Liability and the Rule of Lenity 
 The agencies’ aggressive expansions of theories of 
liability under the SCRA are not only inconsistent with the 
text and structure of the SCRA, but they are also inconsistent 
with the rule of lenity.340  The rule of lenity, a rule that “is 
 
 337. H.R. REP. NO. 108-81, at 39 (2003). 
 338. Compl. at 5, Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 1:99-mc-09999. 
 339. Id. at 4. 
 340. One might argue that the application of the rule of lenity to the SCRA is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s mandate that the SCRA be liberally 
construed in favor of servicemembers.  E.g., Boone, 319 U.S. at 575; LeMaistre 
v. Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1948).  The Court’s jurisprudence however does not 
justify departing from the meaning of the text itself.  In Boone, the Court was 
instructing that the “material effect” test should be interpreted liberally in favor 
of servicemembers, even as the Court itself ruled against the servicemember.  
Boone, 319 U.S. at 575.  In LeMaistre, the Court rejected an argument that the 
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perhaps not much less old than construction itself,”341 
requires a court to interpret ambiguous laws with criminal 
penalties in favor of defendants, thereby giving fair warning 
to potential defendants and narrowing potential criminal 
liability.342  In other words, the rule of lenity is a “basic axiom 
of federal criminal jurisprudence” requiring “that a court 
should adopt the harsher of two rational readings of a 
criminal statute only when Congress has spoken in clear and 
definite language.”343 
 The SCRA, like its predecessors, is a “hybrid” 
statute—providing for both civil and criminal penalties in 
many of its provisions.344  The application of the rule of lenity 
to hybrid statutes like the SCRA has been the subject of much 
debate.345  But courts have increasingly embraced the 
application of the rule of lenity to statutes that, like the 
SCRA, provide for criminal penalties as well as other 
potential consequences.  And where a statute is susceptible to 
multiple interpretations that might otherwise be acceptable, 
the most limiting interpretation must apply in all 
applications—because a single law must have a single 
meaning in all contexts, and the “lowest common 
 
text of the Act should be interpreted more narrowly than the text itself justified.  
In the last sentence, and as a final explanation for why the Court would not 
read the statute in a manner the text itself could not support, the Court cited 
Boone.  Neither case is incompatible with the application of the rule of lenity. 
 341. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820). 
 342. E.g., C.I.R. v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 91 (1959); Keppel v. Tiffin Sav. Bank, 
197 U.S. 356, 362 (1905) (“[A] person or corporation is not to be subjected to a 
penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it.”). 
 343. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. 
REV. 345, 345 (internal quotations omitted). 
 344. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 597-597a (providing for civil liability); 50 U.S.C. 
app. §§ 521(c), 527(e), 531(c), 532(b), 533(d), 535(h), 536(e), 537(c) (providing for 
criminal penalties). 
 345. See, e.g., Stephen Wills Murphy, The Rule of Lenity and Hybrid 
Statutes: WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1129 
(2013); Mark S. Popofsky, The Section 2 Debate: Should Lenity Play a Role?, 7 
RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 1 (2010); Jonathan Marx, How To Construe A Hybrid 
Statute, 93 VA. L. REV. 235 (2007); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic 
Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339 
(2005); Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of 
Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025; Bryan T. Camp, Dual Construction of RICO: The 
Road Not Taken in Reves, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 61 (1994); Bruce A. Markell, 
Bankruptcy, Lenity, and the Statutory Interpretation of Cognate Civil and 
Criminal Statutes, 69 IND. L.J. 335, 336–37 (1994). 
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denominator, as it were, must govern.”346 
 United States v. Thompson/Center Arms347 illustrates 
the point.  In Thompson/Center Arms, the Court had to 
interpret an ambiguous provision of the National Firearms 
Act that included both a civil tax penalty and a criminal 
penalty.348  The plurality opinion applied the rule of lenity, 
reasoning that it “is a rule of statutory construction whose 
purpose is to help give authoritative meaning to statutory 
language.  It is not a rule of administration calling for courts 
to refrain in criminal cases from applying statutory language 
that would have been held to apply if challenged in civil 
litigation.”349 
 The Court in Leocal v. Ashcroft350 again raised the 
application of the rule of lenity to hybrid statutes.  In Leocal, 
the Court addressed whether a DUI conviction was a “crime 
of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and therefore an 
“aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act that could serve as the basis for deportation.351  The court 
ultimately concluded that the term was unambiguous.352  But 
in dicta, the Court noted that if the term had lacked clarity, it 
would have been constrained to interpret the term consistent 
with the rule of lenity.353  Although the court dealt with the 
provision only in the deportation context, the Court noted 
that “it has both criminal and noncriminal applications. 
Because we must interpret the statute consistently, whether 
we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal 
context, the rule of lenity applies.”354 
 The Supreme Court appeared again to invoke the rule 
of lenity in a case involving the Sherman Act.  In 2006, the 
Court in Illinois Tool Works355 overturned the presumption of 
market power in antitrust patent tying cases.356  In reaching 
this decision, the Court contrasted “the normal rule of lenity 
 
 346. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005) (collecting cases). 
 347. United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms, 504 U.S. 505 (1992). 
 348. Id. at 518. 
 349. Id. at 519 & n.10 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 350. 543 U.S. 1. 
 351. 543 U.S. at 3. 
 352. Id. at 11–13. 
 353. Id. at 12 n.8. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
 356. Id. at 31. 
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that is applied in criminal cases” with what the Court termed 
“a rule of severity for a special category of antitrust cases.”357  
The Court emphasized that the same text that would 
establish civil liability under the Sherman Act also “makes 
the conduct at issue a federal crime.”358  Accordingly, the 
Court adopted an interpretation that was consistent with the 
rule of lenity. 
 Recent circuit court opinions have been even more 
definitive in their analysis.  In 2012, the Fourth Circuit in 
WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller359 held that 
the rule of lenity applies to both the civil and criminal 
enforcement of a hybrid statute.360  The court was faced with 
conflicting interpretations of a provision in the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act.361  In explaining why it would adopt 
the reading most favorable to the defendant, the court 
explained that the statute must be interpreted in the same 
way whether civil or criminal penalties were sought.362  And, 
because the rule of lenity would apply to criminal 
prosecution, the rule of lenity must also dictate the 
interpretation in civil proceedings.363  Ruling in favor of the 
defendant, the Fourth Circuit declined to follow a Ninth 
Circuit decision interpreting the same statutory language in a 
different way, reasoning that while “[t]he interpretation is 
certainly plausible,” it is “not clearly warranted by the 
statutory text. . . .  Thus, faced with the option of two 
interpretations, we yield to the rule of lenity and choose the 
more obliging route.”364 
 In 2013, the Sixth Circuit also raised the use of the 
rule of lenity in the context of hybrid statutes.  In Carter v. 
Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc.,365 the court held that the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) 
policy statement on title services companies paying fees to 
real estate agents under the Real Estate Settlement 
 
 357. Id. at 45. 
 358. Id. at 42. 
 359. 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 360. Id. at 204. 
 361. Id. at 203. 
 362. Id. at 204. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. at 205–06 (declining to follow U.S. v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 
2011), rev’d en banc, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 365. 736 F.3d 722 (2013). 
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Procedures Act—a hybrid statute that provides for both civil 
and criminal penalties—was not entitled to deference.366  
Although he wrote the opinion for the unanimous panel, 
Judge Sutton also authored a concurrence addressing the 
interplay between Chevron deference and the rule of lenity.  
Judge Sutton noted that HUD’s position on deference “would 
allow one administration to criminalize conduct within the 
scope of the ambiguity, the next administration to 
decriminalize it, and the third to recriminalize it, all without 
any direction from Congress.”367  Rejecting this view, he 
argued that a statute “is not a chameleon,” and its meaning 
does not change depending on the type of action in which it is 
raised.368  Judge Sutton concluded that “[a]gencies, no less 
than courts, must honor the rule of lenity.”369 
 The DOJ’s and federal banking agencies’ application of 
a strict liability theory to the SCRA, and the agencies’ 
aggressively expansive interpretations of the statutory text, 
are fundamentally inconsistent with the rule of lenity.  As 
discussed above, in many cases the agencies have adopted 
interpretations of the statute that are inconsistent with the 
text of the statute itself.  In such cases, creditors have not 
received fair warning that conduct inconsistent with the 
agencies’ new positions could result in liability.  And even if 
the agencies’ positions could be viewed as reasonable 
interpretations of the statute, the rule of lenity would 
mandate that the interpretation more favorable to the 
defendant must be applied.  But while the agencies’ 
interpretations are inconsistent with the rule of lenity, they 
are consistent with predicted agency behavior in light of 
observed bureaucratic tendencies.  The departure from the 
rule of lenity is one more example of the agencies succumbing 
to the pathologies predicted by regulatory theory. 
IV. THE COSTS OF UPSETTING THE BALANCE 
 While the agencies’ SCRA enforcement actions 
illustrate bureaucratic tendencies toward expansive and 
aggressive interpretations of the laws the agencies administer 
 
 366. Id. at 726. 
 367. Id. at 729 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 368. Id. at 730. 
 369. Id. at 736. 
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and seeking to maximize financial recoveries, the 
enforcement actions also illustrate the observed limitations of 
administrative agencies in evaluating the marginal costs and 
benefits of their actions and a bias toward short-term goals.  
Regulatory theory predicts that agencies will be limited in 
their abilities to evaluate marginal benefits of their actions.370  
This limitation may be more pronounced in enforcement 
actions, where the agencies’ actions are not informed by the 
notice and comment rulemaking process.  The agencies’ 
enforcement actions create significant potential costs to 
consumers generally and servicemembers in particular.371  
There is no indication that the agencies considered these 
costs or how the agencies evaluated them. 
 One potential cost of the agencies’ expansive 
imposition of liability in the SCRA enforcement actions seems 
rather obvious.  When costs are imposed on a company, the 
company will generally pass those costs on to its customers, 
often in the form of higher prices.  This may be particularly 
true when the company competes in a market with imperfect 
competition, a trait common to most markets.372  Thus, when 
a financial institution is penalized for alleged non-compliance 
with the SCRA, the cost of that penalty may be passed on to 
consumers.  The net result is that consumers ultimately bear 
the price of the penalty imposed by the agency.373  In the case 
of the agencies’ SCRA enforcement actions, this means that 
consumers, including other servicemembers, who remained 
current on their financial obligations may pay the price for 
the hundreds of millions of dollars the agencies have required 
to be paid to servicemembers who did not remain current on 
their obligations—even where there is no indication that 
 
 370. See supra Part I.C. 
 371. E.g., Andrew L. Sandler & Kirk D. Jensen, Disparate Impact in Fair 
Lending: A Theory Without a Basis & the Law of Unintended Consequences, 33 
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL. REP. 18 (2014) (discussing unintended costs 
resulting from aggressive interpretation of fair lending laws). 
 372. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. 
REV. 386, 402 (1981) (“If the corporation competes in a product market 
characterized by imperfect competition (a trait of most of the ‘real world’), then 
the fine may be recovered from consumers in the form of higher prices.”). 
 373. E.g., Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of Banks and Crime, U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1, 26 (2014) (noting that consumers in general may be harmed 
when banks are penalized because the costs of the penalties are ultimately 
passed to the consumer). 
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military service in any way affected the servicemember’s 
ability to comply with the obligation.  Ensuring low cost 
financial products for consumers generally falls outside the 
jurisdiction of the agencies that have enforced the SCRA,374 so 
it would be no surprise if it was not fully or adequately 
evaluated. 
 Additionally, the agencies’ expansive interpretations of 
the SCRA through enforcement action increase the risk that 
creditors may be less willing to lend to servicemembers.  The 
concern that an absolute moratorium on actions against 
servicemembers would negatively impact the availability of 
credit to servicemembers was a primary reason the drafters of 
the original SSCRA adopted the balancing of interests over 
the moratorium approach.375  In referring to moratory 
legislation as “mistaken kindness” to servicemembers, the 
House Committee on the Judiciary’s report explained that the 
Committee was concerned that “if there were a total 
prohibition upon enforcing obligations against one in military 
service, the credit of a soldier and his family would be utterly 
cut off.  No one could be found who would extend them 
credit.”376  Continued access to credit may be even more 
important to a servicemember and his or her family at a time 
of activation, particularly in cases where a servicemember’s 
military income may be significantly less than the 
servicemember’s civilian income had been. 
 Although the agencies’ expansive interpretations of 
SCRA provisions and imposition of liability on a strict 
liability theory are not the same as effecting a complete 
moratorium on actions against servicemembers, the agencies’ 
actions still create negative incentives for creditors.  The 
 
 374. E.g., Professor Adam J. Levitin, Testimony Before the United States 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on Enhanced 
Consumer Financial Protection After the Financial Crisis 2–4 (July 19, 2011) 
(asserting that the federal banking agencies’ focus was on the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions, and that consumer protection is not a 
primary role of the banking regulators).  The CFPB, which has consumer 
protection as its primary focus, does not have jurisdiction over the SCRA.  See 
12 U.S.C. §§ 5581–87; see also Hollister K. Petraeus, Protecting Military 
Families, 38 THE REPORTER 235, 238 (2011) (noting that Congress did not give 
the CFPB jurisdiction over the SCRA). 
 375. H.R. REP. NO. 181 (1917), reprinted in 55 CONG. REC. 7789 (1917); see 
also 55 CONG. REC. 7787 (Statement of Rep. Webb) (noting that a rigid 
moratorium would “disturb the soldier’s credit probably in many cases.”). 
 376. Id. 
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agencies’ enforcement actions have placed creditors on notice 
that they will face substantial penalties for noncompliance 
with the SCRA.  But creditors are also now aware that this 
liability will be imposed on a strict liability theory, so that no 
amount of due diligence, compliance efforts, or good 
intentions may shield the creditor from liability.  Indeed, the 
agencies’ guidance in the foreclosure-related file reviews have 
placed creditors familiar with those standards on notice that 
liability may be imposed even when the creditor relied on 
information provided by the Department of Defense 
indicating that a debtor was not eligible for SCRA 
protections.377 
 The agencies’ actions to compensate servicemembers 
under the agencies’ expansive theories also raise issues of 
moral hazard.  Government actions that make it more 
difficult and more expensive for creditors to take actions 
against delinquent consumers create incentives—or at least 
remove disincentives—for consumers to default on their 
obligations.378  For example, a consumer may choose to stop 
making mortgage payments if the consumer believes he or 
she may be able to continue living in the property rent-free 
and pocket the savings.379  Similarly, scholars have shown 
how foreclosure rates are two to three-times higher in states 
with anti-deficiency laws (i.e., laws that prohibit a creditor 
from seeking from a debtor the amount owed beyond the 
value of the collateral).380  In such states, consumers may 
rationally conclude that the lack of ongoing personal liability 
for the mortgage loan after foreclosure makes foreclosure a 
less unattractive option.  Moral hazard issues also arise 
under the positions taken by the agencies in their 
enforcement actions.  For example, if a servicemember can 
 
 377. See supra notes 259–66 and accompanying text. 
 378. Similarly, scholars have argued that government action to modify the 
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benefit from the SCRA’s default judgment protection by not 
making an appearance even if the servicemember has actual 
notice of the proceeding, why bother seeking a stay?381  Or if a 
servicemember believes that he or she may receive 
substantial (i.e., six-figure) monetary compensation for a 
mortgage servicer’s technical violation of the SCRA’s default 
judgment protection, a servicemember may have an incentive 
to gamble that a servicer may get it wrong rather than work 
with the mortgage servicer to resolve the debt in a less risky 
way, such as through a loan modification. 
 This lack of evidence regarding a cost-benefit analysis 
is consistent with the predictions of regulatory theory 
discussed above.  For example, while the risk of limitations on 
credit availability to servicemembers is real, maintaining 
available credit to servicemembers is not within the 
regulatory mission of the DOJ or the federal banking 
agencies.382  Similarly, the negative consequences of moral 
hazard may impact individual servicemembers, but generally 
falls outside these agencies’ regulatory mandate.  So it is not 
surprising that these risks would not factor into the agencies’ 
decisions regarding the positions it has taken in its SCRA 
enforcement actions.  The apparent omission of any cost-
benefit analysis including such longer-term costs is consistent 
with the short-term bias (of providing financial recovery of 
servicemembers the agencies viewed as aggrieved), a tunnel 
vision-type focus on its regulatory mission (taking action 
against perceived violations of the SCRA), and a limited 
ability to evaluate costs outside agencies’ area of expertise 
(costs to other consumers, reduced credit availability to 
servicemembers, and moral hazard). 
CONCLUSION 
 “Support the troops” has long been a national rallying 
cry.  In recent years, this rallying cry has been raised more 
and more in the context of consumer financial services.383  
 
 381. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
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This call recognizes the important contributions and 
tremendous sacrifices servicemembers make in defending our 
nation and its freedoms.  And this rallying cry has been 
extended to the families of servicemembers, who also sacrifice 
when the servicemember is on active duty.384 
 For decades, the SCRA has provided important 
procedural and substantive rights to servicemembers and 
their families regarding consumer financial products and 
services.  For many years, these protections were interpreted 
by the financial services industry and financial services 
regulators consistent with the text and purposes of the Act.  
This changed suddenly and dramatically in the recent and 
extensive series of enforcement actions.  In these enforcement 
actions, the enforcement agencies have taken many expansive 
and aggressive positions inconsistent with the text and 
purposes of the SCRA—and, in some cases, with the agencies’ 
own prior guidance. 
 Whether one agrees or not with the sentiment 
underlying the positions taken in these enforcement actions, 
these actions provide further evidence of the bureaucratic 
tendencies predicted by regulatory theorists.  Regulatory 
theory posits that administrative agencies will seek to expand 
their reach and the application of the statutes they 
administer, subject to the constraints and incentives created 
by their operational framework and various external 
pressures.  Given the sympathetic nature of servicemembers, 
and the widespread negative perception of the financial 
services industry, it is not surprising that enforcement 
agencies would feel relatively unrestrained in how they 
interpret and enforce the SCRA.  And this sentiment has 
been dramatically displayed in the agencies’ enforcement of 
the SCRA in recent years.  Other predilections and cognitive 
biases observed by regulatory theorists in other contexts can 
also be observed in SCRA enforcement actions. 
 Understanding the impact these tendencies and biases 
have on agency decision making is a necessary first step in 
improving that decision making.  While it is possible that 
enforcement agencies might make similar decisions without 
 
 384. E.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, Joining Forces, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/joiningforces (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (“When our 
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the influence of these tendencies, such an outcome is hardly 
guaranteed.  As discussed above, a careful review of the 
history and purpose of the SCRA, the text of the Act 
implementing that purpose, and the potential costs that arise 
from an overly expansive interpretation of the statute, 
strongly support an argument that the agencies should adopt 
different interpretations of the SCRA than they have in 
recent years.  Agency enforcement actions would be better 
informed and more defensible if these regulatory tendencies 
are appropriately considered and transparently addressed. 
 
